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ABSTRACT
This dissertation assesses the impact of tax and expenditure limits on the ability of state and
local governments to raise and spenJ revenues. Currently twenty-four states have laws
limiting government appropriations or revenues.
The fIrst chapter broadly examines the effects of state level limitation laws on both state and
aggregate local spending. Studying the effect of tax and expenditure limits is complicated
by the potential endogeneity of these limits. Voters might be more likely to pass fiscal
limitations in states with higher levels or growth rates of government spending. Using
historical infonnation on tbe availability of direct legislation and recall procedures as
instrumental variables for the passage of tax and expenditure limits, I fmd that s~ate
general expendin!re as a percentage of personal income is two percent smaller in states
with binding limits. This effect is partially offset by higher local spending in these states.
Chapters two and t.-luee examine the labor market effects of tax 3Jld expenditure limits.
Chapter two, w:1ich was coauthored with James Poterba, describes the effect of fiscal
institutions on the relative wages of state and local government employees, and their private
sector counterparts, during the 1979-1992 period. Empirical analysis of data from the
CWTent Population Survey suggests that states with limitations on local property taxes, (L'1d
to a l~sser extent states with state-wide tax and expenditure caps, had slower relative public
sector wage growth during the 1980s. These results are robust to our attempt to control for
the endogeneity of fiscal institutions by using various features of the state legislative
environment at) instrumental variables for the fiscal institutions.
Chapter three, which was co-authored with David Figlio of the University of Oregon,
examines the effects of tax limitation laws on the labor supply decisions of potential
teachers. In this chapter, I examine how the passage of tax limitation laws at tIle school
district level has affected the relative quality of new teachers. Using data from the National
LOllgitudinal Survey of 1972 and the High School and Beyond datasets, \ve find that the
average qlr~Jity of education majors has declined by 10 percent in states which imposed tax
limitation laws relative to states without such laws. In addition, tax limits also reduce the
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Explaining persistent growth of government during the twentieth centUIy is one of
the principal questions in public finance and political economy. A central concern is the
effect of various fiscal institutioJlS on government growth. The "Taxpayer Revolt" in tile
late 1970s and 19805 led to the enactment of many laws limitirtg state and local tax and
expenditure growth. Passage of these limits coincided with a slowdown in the overall rate of
state and local government growth. Nearly two decades after this revolt began, total state
and local spending is 11.0 percent of GDP (1994) compared with 11.9 percenl in 1976. We
are also faced with a new round of tax limitation laws being proposed and passed at the same
time that state and local governments are being asked to take a larger role in providing
services such as welfare and health services. Examining the effects from the tax limits that
were passed in the late 1970s will help us Wlderstand the possible pitfalls faced by state and
local government officials as these new limits are implemented.
In this dissertation, I examine the role these earlier tax limitation laws have played in
curtailillg the growth rate in state and local expenditures, as well as affecting the level of
government providing services. I find that tax limit laws do constrain government growth in
some states. I further examine the characteristic-s of these laws and the effect of these laws
on the public sector labor force.
Chapter one explores the effect of constitutional and legislative tax and expenditure
limits on state and local government spending over the last two decades. Currently
t"Nenty-four states have laws limiting government appropriations or revenues. In spite of
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this aggregate evidence of a decrease in state aIid local spending, prior work h~ found
mixed evidence on whether fiscal institutions matter. This could be due to the potential
endogeneity of the proposal or passage of these limits. The passage of limits could reflect
changes in voter preferences about the size of government, and these changes could lead to
changes in state revenue or expenditure levels, but liraits may not playa causal role. The
alternate finding could also be true; if limits were more likely to be passed in states with
higher growth rates in government spending, then cross-sectional comparisons of states with
and without limits could lead to a positive correlation bet\veen limits and state government
growth. Using historical iIuormation on the availability of direct legislation and recall
procedures as instrumental variables for tax and expenditure limits, I find that state general
expenditure as a percentage of personal income is two percent smaller in states with
binding limits. This effect is partially offset by higher local spellding in these states. In
addition, the type of limit seems to matter; limits on both state and local governments
produce greater reductions in spending than state limits alone and revenue limits appear
more constraining than expenditure limits.
I then more specifically examine how these cuts in government spending affect the
public sector labor force. In a joint paper with James Poterba, I describe the effect of fiscal
institutions on the pattern of relative wages between state and local government employees
and their private sectur counterparts during the 1979-1992 period. Empirical aJlalysis of
data from the Current Population Survey suggests that states with limitations on local
property taxes, and to a lesser extent states with state-wide tax and expenditure caps, display
8
slower relative public sector wage growth during the 1980s. These results are robust to our
attempt to control for the endogeneity of fiscal institutions by using various features of tile
state legislative environment as instrumental variables for the fiscal institutions. We also
find tllat states with more favorable public sector bargaining environments seem to have
been more likely to pass tax and expenditure limits.
The third chapter in this dissertation, which was co-authored with David Figlio,
examines the passage of tax limitation laws at the school district level and tile effects these
limitations have on the supply of new teachers. Previous authors, have found that the
passage of tax limitation laws leads to both reduced spending and lower student
achievement. However the economics of education literature has found little direct effect of
spending on student outcomes. We posit that tax limitation laws rnight affect student
outcomes by discouraging more qualified individuals from becoming teachers in tax limit
states. Using data from the l\lational Longitudinal Survey 1972 and High School and
Beyond datasets we find that the average quality of education majors has declined 10 'percent
in states which imposed tax limitation laws, relative to states without such laws. In addition,




Tax Limitations and Government Growtb: Tbe Effect of State Tax and Expenditur-t:
Limits on State and Local Government
Explaining persistent growth of government during the t\ventieth century is one of
the principal questions in public finance and political economy. A central corlcem is tile
effect of various fiscal institutions on government growth. The IITaxpayer Revolt" in the
late 1970s and 1980s led to the enactment of many laws limiting state ~J1d local tax and
expenditure growth. Passage of these limits coincided with a slowdrJwn in the o\terall rate of
state and local government growth. Nearly two decades after this revolt began, total state
and local spending is 11.0 percent ofGDP (1994) compared w1th 11.9 percent in 1976.
In spite of this aggregate evidence ofa decrease in state and local spending, prior
work has found mixed evidence on whether fiscal institutioD3 matter. The passage of limits
could reflect changes in voter preferences about the size of government, and these changes
could lead to changes in state revenue or expenditure levels, but limits may not playa causal
role. The alternate finding could also be true; if limits were more likely to be passed in
states with higher growth rates in government spending, then cross-sectional comparisons of
states with and without limits could lead to a positive correlation between limits and state
government growth.
Currently twenty~fourstates have constitutional or statutory state tax and/or
expenditure limits (TELs). Beginning in the late 1970s, states pa'ised limits on the growth
10
rate of state spending or re\'enues, usually limiting this growth rate to the growth rate of
personal income. Concurrently, many referenda \vere proposed limiting the use of local
property taxes. Proposition 13 in California and Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts are the
most famous taxpayer initiatives for property tax reform. Many more state limits than local
limits were passed; of 11 local property tax limits propos~d during the 1975-1985 period,
three were passed, while of 30 state limits proposed, 26 were passed ~ .
Right after the passage of these limits their effectiveness was questioned. In 1982
the National Tax Journal published a symposium on TELs. The contributors explored how
binding these limits were in individual states, and most found little response in state
revenues or expenditures. These studies necessarily focused on a short period after TELs
were enacted.
More recent empirical studies have also found weak, if any, evidence that TELs
affect revenues or expenditures. Abrams and Dougan (1986) explore the effect of different
constitutional restrictions on state and local spending levels in 1980. Borrowing limits WId
line item-veto laws do not seem to matter. State TELs seem to have a negative and
marginally significant effect on state and local spending in 1980, but a weak positive effect
on state level spending. Abrams and Dougan do find that states with reelection restrictions
have higher levels of spending.
Dougan (1988), estimating individual time series regressions for states with TELs,
IThe difference between states which currently have limits and states whicll passed limits
in the 1975-1985 period is caused by a limit expiring in New Jersey and by passage of multiple
limits in Missouri and North Carolina.
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finds mixed evidence on the effects ofTELs. In SOfae states, limits seem to have been
effective, while in others, there were positive changes in expenditure levels after TELs were
passed. Dougan finds evidence to support the 11ypothesis that TELs act as signals betweell
voters and the legislature, and he reports weak evidence that some limits are effective
controls. Bails (1990) compares average growth rates across states with and without limits
using linear trend models and concludes that limits are not effective. Finally, NASBO
(1988) examines revenue and expenditure levels as a percent of personal income and finds
little difference between these variables in states with and without limits as well as little
change in these percentages across the two groups from 1980 to ]987.2
The foregoing evidence looks at tile effect of limits in the period after passage.
There is some evidence of short-run effects in states responses to the fiscal shocks of the
early 1990s. Poterba (1994) finds that in response to Wlexpected deficits states with TELs
raised taxes less often than states without TELs. This evidence does not resolve the questivn
of whether these effects persist, and whether they affect long run spending levels. Poterba
and Rueben (1995) find e\'idence that the presence of both state and local limits slow the
growth in relative wages for state and local workers.
There are many factors that could explain a limited impact of TELs. For example,
legislatures may circumvent limits, by transferring program responsibility to sub-state
2 fvlore evidence exists on the effectiveness of local limits, with many researchers
studying the effects of various local limits. Using panel data, Preston and Ichniowski (1992) find
that state limits on local property taxes decrease the growth rate in both property tax revenues
and overall municipal revenues. Figlio (1995) finds loc.allimits significantly affect school input
measures. He also finds that limits are endogenously determined and that instrumenting for the
presence of limits significantly increases the size of the measured effects.
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governments or by fmancing spending with new debt. The endogeneity of the limits may
also explain their small apparent effects, since states with higher spending may be more
likely to adopt TELs. Previous sttldies have also failed to distinguish between different
types of TELs, and have not taken account of the purely advisory nature of certain limits
This paper explores the effect of constitutional and legislative limits on the size of
state and local government over the last two decades. By estimating spending and revenue
equations after correcting for simultaneity in the adoption deci~ion and by lookillg at how
spending patterns evolve after passage of limits, I prescnt new evidence that state-level
limitations do reduce the level of state government expenditures. I then analyze whether
spending reductions are offset by additional local spending.
This paper is divided into five sections. Section one describes TELs in more detail
and focuses on the differences in laws passed by different states. Section two briefly
examines different theories of government and the predicted effects of limits and presents
the empirical strategy of this paper. Sectiol1 three describes factors that affect the passage of
TELs. I present empirical results which show that states with historical direct legislation
processes that encourage voter participation in the l(~gislative process were more likely to
enact limits in the 1976- I986 period.
Section four describes the empirical results and the data used for this study. While
ordinary least squares estimation suggests that states with TELs do not have lower long run
levels of spending; once the endogenous nature of these limits is recognized, the results
indicate that states with limits seein to spend less, although this decrease is partially offset
by additional local spending. In addition, the type of limit seems to matter. Limits on both
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state and local governments produce 8 gr(.~ater reduction in overall spending than limits only
on state governments. Finally, section five concludes and describes further directions for
this research.
1. The History and Structure of Tax and Expenditure Limits
TELs were initially introduced in the late 1970s. Many theories try to explain the
sudden tax revolt of this period. These include beliefs that government spending was higher
than voters preferred~ a growing disillusionment with government in general after Watergate,
and public outrage over increasing state and loc,'~ government surpluses while disposable
personal income was falling. In addition, Fischel (1994) argues that when school finance
equalization lawsuits led to equallunding of public· schools, the severing of tile relationship
between local taxes an.d services led to Proposition 13 in California and in general to the tax
revolt of the late 19708. The introduction of state tax limits coincided with a general public
discontent with the size of government in general and with the property tax in particular.
TELs often arose as compromise measures passed by state legislatures in response to
proposed referenda on property tax limits.
Public demand for prorerty tax limits was motivated by several factors. Between
1970 and 1980, property values increased dramatically. As these increases were reflected in
assessmerjt5~ property taxes also rose. Rising property valuatiollS and tax levels were
especially fioticeable in California, where rising house values and 1T1andatory proJ: '~rty
reassessment led. to large increases in property tax bills even though local (and state)
governments, were opcrJ.t';ilg '1,V.d:t; large surpluses. Figure 1, panel I illustrates the level of
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California state and local revenues and expenditures as a percent of personal income. In
1978, not only were revenue levels at a Ilistorlcally high level, they were also almost twenty
percent higher than expenditures. While several TELs \vere passed earlier than the limit in
California, the passage of Proposition 13 is generally acknowledged as the beginning of the
tax revolt movement in the United Stxtes.
Several examples of the history of limit passage illustrate the heterogeneity in state
TELs and in how they were enacted. California's Proposition 13, passed in 1978, limited the
maximum property tax to one percent of "fair cash value of property, II Wllich equals cash
value of property as stated in the 1975-1976 tax bill or appraisal value at time of
construction or change of ownership.) Changes in appraised property value were limited to
the minimum of the change in the consumer price index or two percent. In addition, the
state was not allowed to introduce any new taxes on real property and any increase in state
taxes had to be approved by two-thirds of each house. Finally, p·assage of any other new
local taxes required the approval of two-thirds of all registered voters.
Prior to passage, politicians, academics and newspapers predicted fiscal disaster if
Proposition 13 was passed. In fact, the state used its $6.8 billion surplus to make up the 30
percent cut in property tax revenues caused by passage of Proposition 13. This state bailout
was made permanent by a state commission. This led to a change in the composition of state
arId local finance in California and a substantial loss of local autonomy. Proposition 13 was
quickly followed by Proposition 4, which limited state and local expenditure growth to the
3Q'Sullivan, Sexton and Sheffiin (1994) examine the legacy of Proposition 13, especially
measuring the effects of the re-valuation provision on home ownership and mobility decisions.
15
lesser of the change in per capita personal income or the inflation rate plus the change ill
population. In this case, voters wanted to curb the increasing state spending which occurred
after Proposition 13 was passed and local revenues were constrained. Dworak (1980)
examines the events leading up to passage of propositions ]3 and 4 and gives a history of
earlier, unsuccessful limitation attempts in California.
The New Jersey legislature's 1976 passage of an expenditure limit is an early '"fEL.
This constrained future expenditure to the same percent of persollal income as in the prior
year. The legislature passed this law after spending two acrimonious sessions trying to
resolve court mandated property tax revisions and school financing restrictions. After
closing the New Jersey public. schools in 1976 when a budget eouid not be agreed upon, an
income tax was grudgingly introduced. The new income tax statute contained an
expenditure limit to signal that the income tax would not be further used to increase the size
of the state government. The statute also limited the growth in local spending to 5 percent
per year. The limit was extended once and then allowed to expire in 1983. The New Jersey
income tax is still in effect. Figure 1, panel 2 shows the aggregate revenue and expenditlJre
levels for New Jersey over this period.
In contrast, some TELs were enacted by state legislatures to avoid passage of more
binding limits - usually on property taxes. In November 1978, voters in Nevada approved
Proposition 6, a measure similar to Proposition 13, by a 3: 1 margin. However, citizen
initiatives must be approved in consecutive biennial elections. Before the second vote in
1980, the state legislature produced a tax reduction package that reduced both local property
taxes and eliminated state sales taxes on food. It also included limits on the growth rate of
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proposed state and local expenditure. This tax relief package was passed conditional on the
defeat of Proposition 6. Proposition 6 was defeated, and while spending and taxes
temporarily decreased, they quickly rose again given the non-binding nature oftlle limit in
place. Total state and local spending and revenues are shown in the third panel of Figure 1.
III 1994, a more binding limit was enacted limiting growth in state and local expenditure to
the inflation rate.4 Finally, the fourth panel of Figure 1 shows state and J.o~al revenues and
expenditure in New York, a state which never proposed or passed a spending limit ,despite
high levels of state and local taxes.
Table 1 presents information on the characteristics of state TELs and Figure 2
illustrates the pattern of passage of limits over time and differences in the restrictiveness of
limits.S Twelve of the twenty-four state limits currently in force restrict the growth in state
expenditures or revenues to the gro\\rth rate in personal income a\geraged over some prior
period. In five states the limits restrict the size of general fund appropriations to a cel1ain
percent of state personal income, while in four states growth is restricted to some function of
inflation and population growth. Finally, three states restrict the absolute expenditure
growth rate.6 TELs typically apply to only a subset of spending. Spendillg on capital
4There has recently been renewed activity in the passage of tax limits. For a review of
other recent enactments see Moore & Stansel (1994). In addition, both Figlio(1996) and Dye and
McGuire (1996) have found real short tenn effects of these new limits.
SMore detailed infonnation on each state is present~d in Appendix A.
6Since virtually all states have balanced budget rules, revenue limits and expenditure
limits should be effectively equivalent, differing only by the amount of existing surpluses or a
state's borrowing for current expenditures. Different effects on spending and revenues can shed
light on how binding state balanced budget rules are in practice.
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projects, and from federal funds,. is excluded. In addition, a number of states exclude
additional spending which occurs as a result of federal or court mandates. Thirteen states
can override the limits with a superm~jority vote. Five states require a simple majority and
the declaration by the governor of a state of emergency. Half of these limits are
constitutional and half are statutory.
The majority ofTELs \\~ere initiated or proposed by legislatures, although several
prominent ones resulted from citizen initiatives. A majority of the legislative proposals
encompassed original citizen initiatives. This could reflect legislatures responding to voter
demand and passirlg limits in a speedier, Jess costly fashion. An alternate, more cynical
interpretation is that legislatures preempted voter illitiatives to control the structure of the
limitation.
During the 19705, many states also passed legislation which imposed limits on city
or county property taxes. States have historically prohibited intra-state govermnents from
having local income and sales taxes, and in cases where such taxes are allowed, the rates are
set by the sta~e government. Such limits increase the effect of limits on state spending.
Thirty-four states currently limit local property taxes in some way. Most of these limits
apply to assessment increases or set maximum rates. Only California, Idaho and
Massachusetts have laws like Proposition 13. An additiGnal two states (New Jersey and
Michigan) have binding limits on overall local spending or revenue as well.
Of the 25 limits passed, three limits were written as purely advisory laws, suggesting
growth rates or only affecting budgeted revenues or expenditw"es. An additional four states
have laws which are advisory in practice. These states, including Nevada until 1994, have
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limits which can be over-ridden or amended by a simple legislative majority. In these states
increasing spending or taxes beyond the limited amoWlt is no more difficult in practice than
passing any appropriations bill.
2. Conceptual Framework and Empirical Methods
In section 2.1, I discuss different models of government and what these models say
about the effectiveness of TELs. I then examine the potential effects of limits and how these
differ with the type of limit. I am interested in how states respond to limits wid whether
different types of limits have different effects. in section 2.2, I discuss the empirical
modelling strategy I employ and how testing the effectiveness of these limits is complicated
by their endogeneity.7
2.1 Models of State Government
Snldying the effect of TELs on the level of spending at first glance seems
superfluous. In a world of perfect infonnation, there would be no role for limits, since
expenditure levels would be optimally set. If legislators cannot perfectly predict voter
wishes vis-a-vis the appropriate level of spending, thell TELs can act as signals. Laws
which explicitly limit the growth rate of spending should lead to less spending since linlits
should act as a strong indicator of voters' preferences. However, if govenunent spending
reflects not just the wishes of voters but also other goals of legislators, as in a Leviathan or
7In future work~ I intend to examine more closely the political economy of the adoption
process and what proposing and passage of limits and other fiscal institutions reveals about the
appropriateness of Inedian voter, Tiebout and Leviathan models of government behavior.
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budget maximizing bureaucratic model of government, then the level of spending might be
higher than optimal from the voters' perspective. Legislators could try to maintain this level
of spending by circumventing the limits. This could lead to effects voters never intended,
such as a proliferation of special districts or a transfer of program responsibility between the
different levels of government.S.9
Abrams and Dougan (1986), building on the "Leviathan" models of Brennan and
Buchanan (1979), develop a theoretical framework for considering the effect of changes in
government institutions. Dougan (1988) applies this theory to TELs and gives three
explanations for the passage of TELs.
Traditional Leviathan theory posits that government acts as a monopoly created by
voters. Once in power, government agents maximize the size of government subject to the
constraints of being re-elected and (possibly) constitutional constraints. TELs act as a
further constraint on governments from growing too large. If tllls were true, TELs would
only be enacted as voter initiatives, all states who could would adopt TELs, and TELs would
lead to slower growth in the size of government.
81 will discuss the relationships between TELrs and revenues and expellditures. TEL,s can
affect both revenues and spending given the almost lutear relationship between them. In general,
when I am focusing on government actions and legislators I will talk about expenditures since
legislatures typically have certain activities or functions they want the state to provide. In
contrast, when I talk about limits from the voter's perspective I will talk about revenues, since
voters in general want to minimize taxes.
9In a standard median voter model the level of expenditure is detennined by the
preferences of the median voter. Half of the voters would prefer less spending but the other half
would prefer more spending. Constitutional restrictions and referenda leading to tax and
expenditure limits would not receive the super-majorit'j needed to pass if this model were
correct.
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Dougan (1988) proposes two other reasons for passage of limits, which allow for
differences betweell states and explain both ineffective limits and legislatively proposed
limits. One theory states that limitations act as a signal of changing voter preferences.
Given that passing referenda is a lengthy process, changes in revenues or spending could
occur before the TEL takes effect. Similarly a TEL proposed by the legislature could be a
signal from the legislature that the change in preferences was in fact recognized and that
levels of spending will reflect the change in preferences.
The second theory postulates that if voter tastes change, or if the size of government
is getting far beyond voter optimum levels, then voters nlight adopt a TEL as a signal or
warning to elected officials. States with faster growth rates would then be more likely to
pass these limits, which could then lead to slowed growth after the limits were in place.
TELs could be a less costly way of changing levels of spending than having to replace the
entire legislature. Under this model, changes in the size of government would occur with or
without passage of the limit if voter long-tenn preferences are satisfied. TELs simply act as
a way to change the equilibrium size of government. If this were the reason for TELs being
passed, government growth would be lower because of changes in voter preferences; thus a
correlation between TELs and slower growth in the size of government is not necessarily
evidence that TELs do act as an effective restraint.
2.2 Empirical Method
It is difficult to argue that the passage of a tax or expenditure limit is an exogenous
shock, uncorrelated with the detenninants of state taxes and expenditures. Such policy
changes are especially prone to the criticism raised by Besley and Case (1994) in their
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critique of the "Natural Experiment" in public policy. Besley and Case question the
randomness in assignment across govemrnents of policies that these same governmellts set.
If states with higher levels of spending are more likely to pass TELs, aIId spending patterns
persist over time, then ensuing data analysis could reveal a spurious positive relationship
between TELs and spending. This finding could emerge even ifTELs actually have a
negative effect. Alternately, if voter tastes for spending change so that voters prefer less
government spending, and this shift motivates voters to propose or pass TELs, then a
negative coefficient on TELs could indicate that they act as a proxy for ihe change in voter
tastes and the actual limit could have little effect as a constraint. Using an instrumental
variable approach, I hope to separate the constraining effect of these limits from the changes
in underlying voter preferences which could have led to their passage. I will compare the
results of simple OLS regressions from regression results that instrument for the enactment
ofa TEL.
To solve the endogeneity rroblem, I need to find variables that are correlated with
the probability of a state passing a limit but which do not directly affect the level of revenues
raised by a state. If revenues are a function of state attributes, voter attributes, and the
presen,:e of TELs (equation 1), and if the probability of a state having a TEL is a function of
current and prior revenue levels, other state attributes and voter attributes including tastes for
the size of government and taste for participation in the legislative process, then \ve have a
simultaneous equation model. It is impossible to tell whether TELs are effectively
constraining state and local government revenues without estimating both equations.
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Fonnally, I assume that
Rev =X *A +Z *A +TEL *A +Year *1\ +Ejl jl t'l }I t'2 jl P3 1 P 4 jl (1)
where Ajt is a vector of state attributes including gross state product, federal grants, the state
unemployment rate, state population and growth in population as well as some state
demographic variables, and ~I is a vector of observable and unobservable voter attributes
including a proxy for the liberalness of voters, the average ADA score of each state's
representatives by year and an unobservable taste for government !iervices. I also model the
probability of having a TEL as
(2)
Ins! is a vector of variables which do not directly affect Reljt, but help predict whether a state
has a limit based on the other theories of limit passage. Using single equation OLS
regression techniques, it is impossible to separate out the direct effects of TELs on reven.ue
and expenditure levels if there are unobservable voter attributes Zk that affect both REJ~t and
TEL)t. These unobserved voter attributes will become unmeasured components of € and IJ.
and bias the estimated coefficient on TEL}t. Since I am primarily interested in identif}'ing the
effects ofTELs on revenues and expenditures, I focus on finding instruments that are
correlated with the probability of a state having a TEL, but are not correlated with the
random component of state revenue or expenditure levels. Therefore, my empirical strategy
will be to find instruments which help explain enactment of TELs and yet are not directly
related to voter tastes for government revenues or ex~enditures.
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In addition to estimating equation (1) which asswnes Ejr and TELjl are uncorrelated, I
also estimate (1) substituting TEL jt, the predicted probability of state j having a limit in year
k, for TEL);. Comparing the results of these two specifications will provide evidence on the
endogeneity of the passage of limits. Under the null hypothesis of random state assignment
of limits, the OLS estimates of equation (1) should be both consistent and efficient, while
the IV estimate will be consistent. However, ifpassage ofTELs is not random across states,
then the OLS estimates Call be biased and inconsistent while the IV estimates are consistent.
One way of implenlenting a Hausman (1978) specification test in this case is to include ihe
estimated residuals from equation (2) in the IV regression of equation (1). I estimate
(3)
where Jijt is the estimated residual from equation (2). The null of random assignment is
rejected if P3 =1= Ps in equation (3).
I also estimate OLS regressions includiag state fixed effects. The estimate of TEL in
these regressions is dependent only on within-state, across-time effects. This can better
control for unobserved fixed state effects. Unfortunately, due to the time invariallCe of the
instruments I use, state fixed effects cannot be included in the IV estimates.
3. The Determinants of Tax and Expenditure Limit Passage
The effectiveness of TELs can be either under- or over-stated due to the endogenous
nature of passage. States with higher levels of spending might be more likely to pass limits
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if voter tastes change, or states with voters who prefer less government services might be
more likely to pass limits. This makes testing for the endogeneity of limits critical to
understanding any role these institutions can ha\'e on the size of government. As outlined in
section 2.2, I need to use information which is related to enactment of stAte limits but not
directly related to government revenues or spending. If the probability ofa state enacting a
limit is related both to voter tastes for government spending and to voter tastes for
participation in government, then variables which affect voter participation can be used to
estimate which states have TELs.
In section 3.1, I give detailed infonnation on the instruments used .. these include
direct legislation rules and infonnation on voter ability to recall elected officials. Section
3.2 then presents linear probability models of TEL enactment (equation 2). These
regressions are not a complete description of why states pass or have limits; they are used to
predict the probability ofpassing a TEL using information which is believed not to affect
state revenue and expenditures directly.
3.1 Description of Instruments
The primary instrument I use for TELs is an indicator variable which equals 1 if a
state has a constitutional procedure for citizens proposing and passing referenda or
initiatives. lo Typically, direct legislation provisions have always been part of the state's
constitution or were passed in the 1900s. I have infonnation on whether states allow
IOInfonnation on direct legislation is ta~en from Magleby (1984). Matsusaka (1995)
includes a good discussion of the different aspects of direct legislation provisions and the
political climate in which they were passed.
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statutory initiatives, constitutional initiatives or referenda; because the same state typically
has more than one procedure I consider only whether a state has any direct legislation
process. 1I Figure 3 presents a cross-state comparison of direct legislation laws and
highlights the high correlation between citizen initiative and referenda rules. I use
infonnation on direct legislative processes from Magleby (1982). Due to the recent
enactment of their initiative laws, I do not count Florida, Illinois and Wyoming as having
direct referendum laws. These states first allowed initiatives to be proposed in 1978, 1970
and 1968 respectively. The classification of these three states as non direct legislation states
is done to avoid another potelltial source of endogeneity; a change in direct legislation rules
can reflect voter discontent with the size of government. In some specifications I also
include variables on the ability of voters to recall legislators. '"These laws were also passed
during of the Populist movement (! 890-1920). 12
Existing empirical evidence on the link between direct legislation processes and
spending and revenue levels is inconclusive. Zax (1989) and Farnham (1990) find small,
marginally significant, and positive effects of direct legislation processes on government
liThe states with historical provisions for direct legislation are Alaska, Arizon~
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahom~ Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, and Washington.
12Another set of potential instruments is information on school finance lawsuits. Fischel
(1989) argues for a link between school finance lawsuits and at least local property tax limits. It
is not clear, ho\vever, that the overall level of revenues and expenditures are not also directly
affected by these lawsuits. I have used information on the presence or success of a lawsuit in
alternate regression specifications as instruments and covariates. The inclusion of these variables
does not change the estimated effect of state TELs in the state finance equatiol1S.
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e:<penditures in cross-sectional regressions. However, Matsusaka (1995) finds that states
with direct legislation provisions have lower levels of both state and state and local
expenditures. Matsusaka looks at state-level data over the 1960-1990 time period while the
earlier work focussed on single cross-sectiol1 results.
To explore the difference in these two sets of findings, I estimate reduced fonn
revenue and spending equations for the period between 1961 and 1992
(4)
where Ajt denotes state specific variables including per capita income, population and federal
grants received, Yearl is a set of annual indicator variables and RegioYlk is a set of nine
regional indicator variables. Directjl is an. indicator variable which equals one if voters in
state j have the ability to pass legislation directly. Table 2 presents the results of estimating
equation 4 from 1961-1990. Colurrms 1 and 4 present regression results for the entire
sample period. State and local per capita expenditure is $66 (34)13 less in states with direct
legislation laws than in states without direct legislation laws, similarly state and local
revenue is $70 (34) less in states with direct legislation laws. These numbers are not
statistically different from those found in Matsusak3 (1995) despite differences in covariates
and regression specifications.
I then test for a structural change in the model and estimate separate reduced form
lJStandard errors are presented in parentheses for reported estimated coefficients.
Standard errors have been adjusted to account for within state-group correlation and between
group heteroskedasticity using White (1980) techniques.
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equations before and after the tax revolt of the late 1970s. I find that states with direct
referendwn laws spend approximately $1 04 (41) less per capita after 1977 than states
without direct referenda laws as compared to spending $28 (32) less before 1978. Similarly
state and local revenues were $128 (46) less in state!: with direct legislation rules after 1977
as compared with $16 (32) less in states with direct legislation rules before 1978. In the
above results, states with direct legislation are defined as those states with citizen initiative
or referenda laws in place before 1960. 14 The null hypothesis of no structural break in these
equations js also rejected at standard confidence levels. This lends support to the hypothesis
that the Yiay direct legislation provisions affect state revenues or expenditures is through
passage of TELs.
3.2 Determinants of TEL Adoption
Table 3 present~ estimates for a linear probability model of a state having a TEL in
place. Columns 1 and 2 include only the instruments and year effects. My primaI)'
specification will only use the presence ofdirect referenda laws, while the alternate
specification will also include infonnation on the ability of voters to recall elected officials. IS
The ability of voters to pass legislation directly incre3Ses the probability of passing a TEL
by 16 percent (6). Column 2 includes an indicstor variable for voters' ab.ility to recall
14The results are even more pronounced if states with newly passed laws are included as
direct referenda states after passage of the new rules. Similarly the difference in results is
stronger if the period around the tax revolt (1975-1980) is omitted fronl both samples.
J5Inciuding a second instrument allows me to test the appropriateness of excluding the
instruments from the revenue and experlditure equations directly. I will also later be interested in
disentangling the effects of different types of limits and will need more than one instrument.
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elected officials. The coefficient on the presence of direct legislation laws decreases to 12
percent (5). States with recall laws are 13 percent (7) more likely to have passed a limit. 16
Columns 3 and 4 present linear probability models including the covariates from equation 3.
The coefficients on the direct legislation :md recall variables do not significantly change.
The covariates have marginal explanatory power in predicting passage of limits and
the estimated effects go in the expected direction. States with higher gross state product are
less likely to adopt a limit, while fa~ter growing states and states with a higher population
are more likely to pass limits. A higher unemployment rate also seems to increase the
probability of having a state limit in place. These variables reflect how well a state is doing
comparatively over time and also the fact that limits are mor~ likely to be in place during
periods of economic distress. In addition, the presence of more children in the population,
which could act as a proxy for higher state and local spending, increases the probability of
having a limit. In contrast, the percent of population over 65 docs not seem to affect the
probability of ha\ling a TEL.
States with higher federal grants are less likely to have a limit in place. 'This reflects
their lower cost of providing a given level of government services. 17 Finally, while I include
16Including information on school fmance suits does not statistically effect the predictive
ability of the direct legislation variable. The coefficient on recall laws decreases to 9.5 percent
(6), while the inclusion of a school finance lawsuit increases the probability of passage of a TEL
by 15.4 percent (7.2).
17Depending on the nature of the Federal Aid received, either the marginal or average cost
of government services can be affected. If federal aid is given in block grants, then the price of
the marginal government purchase is unchanged. However, if federal grants reqllire nlatching
state funds, then the marginal price of the given service has decreased and we could expect
increased government purchases.
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average ADA scores for house members this does not seem to affect the probability of
passing a TEL. I also include yearly indicator variables, which are statistically significanl.
Unsurprisingly, stat~s are more likely to have TELs in later years. 18
4. Empirical Findings
I estimate linear expenditure and revenue models for state and local governments for
the 48 continental states. 19 I would like to test the response of both state finances covered by
TELs and the response of non-restricted funds. Examining expenditures \\,hich are explicitly
covered by limits will give the clearest evidence on the direct effect of limits. Changes in
these expenditures or revenues could reflect a decrease in total government spending or a
shift in expenditure to another (non-covered) category of government. I would therefore like
data on both state general fund spending and revenues as well as overall state and local
finances before and after limits were enacted.20 General fund data will give evidence of a
direct effect of limits, while data on broader measures of state and local finances can be used
18 Regressions based only on across state differences produce very similar results given
the time invariant nature of the instruments. Regression results include standard errors which
have been adjusted to allow for within state correlation and between state heteroskedasticity.
19 In the results presented I omit Hawaii and Alaska from the estimation. Including or
excluding Hawaii does not affect the results. Including Alaska, which has extremely high
severance taxes, does seem to matter. State aIld local revenues as a percent of personal income
for Alaska in 1990 are S5 percent, much higher than the US average of 19 percent. However,
most of the revellues are from taxes on natural resources and the burden of these taxes do not fall
on Alaskan residents. In contrast, 1990 state and local revenues from property, sales and income
taxes was only 5.7 percent of personal income.
20 I defme statej as having a limit in year j, if a limit was passed (and not repealed) prior to
the beginning of fiscal year j. States with advisory limits or limits which can be overridden by a
simple legislative majority are not counted as "limit" states.
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to test for offsetting effects. To measure these two effects I use data from two sources,~
National Association of State BudKet Qfficers (NASBO) and The Department of Commerce..
Bureau of the Census (Census). Section 4.1 briefly describes these datasets and discusses
the relative strengths and weaknesses of each.
I estimate two OLS regre3sion models, including and excluding state fixed effects,
and an IV model where the presence or absence of a binding lilnit is replaced with the
predicted probability ofstateJ·llaving a TEL in year 1 from equation 2. Since most limits
constrain state expenditures to a percent of personal income, the dependent variable is
expenditure or revenue as a percentage of state persor!al income. The coefficients Of. the
covariat~s are interpreted as the effect ofchanges in the covariate relative to the value of
state personal income. Estimating aggregate government expenditure and revenue equations
using total or per capita spending gives similar results to those reported below.
Section 4.2 presents regression results on the responsiveness of state general fimd
expenditures and revenues to limits using the NASBO data. This data best measures
categories of state spending which are explicitly covered by TELs. Section 4.3 then uses the
Census data to explore the effect of limits on a more broadly defined set of both state and
local finance data for a longer period of time than that available in the NASBO dataset.
Finally, Section 4.4 explores differences between various types of limits.
4.1 Govemment Finance Data
State expenditure and revenue data are from two sources, Fiscal Survey orille States,
a collection of annual surveys of state budget officers published by NASBO, and
Goyernment Finances and State Goyernment Finances annual statistics published by the
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Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. I will refer to these data sets as the
NASBO data and the Cen,;us data respectively.
The NASBO data includes infonnation on general fund sperlding and revenues.
These figures measure what administrators in each state consider the state's general fund and
so best measure the category of spending covered b}' state limits. The disadvantage of this
data is that it is only available for a limited time period (1982-1990), which is after passage
of most of the TELs. In addition, the amount of total state spending which is included in
this survey can differ greatly from state to state. This data will best capture any direct
effects ofTELs but cannot be used to measure offsetting effects which might occur.
The Bureau of the Census collects annual information on both state an,d aggregate
within state local spending and revenues. I use data from 1970-1991, covering the period
before limits were adopted as well as that following the tax revolt. This data has the
advantage of covering a longer time period and it also pennits me to examine bOtll state and
local spending and revenues, as well as different categories of spending.
The disadvantage of the Census data is the breadth of the definition of general fund
fman.ces. Although the definition of general fund revenues and expenditures in the Census
Data is more unifonn across states than in the NASBO data, the only government finances
excluded from the general fund category are those of state-owned utilities and liquor stores
and insurance trust revenue. While these categories of spending and revenues are never
directly covered by l'ELs, the reported general fund figures do include other categories of
spending and revellues which are also not covered directly by TELs. These categories
include intergovernmental aid and revenues and expenditures from special funds. However,
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the Census data can be used to check if the enactnent ofTELs had an effect on aggregate
state spending or led to a re-categorization of spending or revenue sources.
The Census data can also be used to c.heck for effects of TELs on the size of the total
state and local government. By examining local spending and revenues and aggregate state
and local finances, I Call test for a shift in the level of service provision. One caveat must be
made about the local data. While this is the primary source of annual local government
finance data available, it is not based on a comr.rehensive accounting of local governments.
It is based on total sampling of local entities above a certain size and a proportional
sampling of others based on financial activi~/.21 This leads to an additional source of
variance, due to sampiing error in the local spending and revenue equations and the total
state and local finance equations.
To illustrate the difference between the two datasets, note that the NASBO data
estimates of average state general fund spending is 6 percent (standard deviation 1.4) of
personal income in 1986, while the Census (18ta estimate is 8.25 percent (2.1). TIle
difference between the revenue figures is mDre striking; the NASBO estimate is 5.6 percent
(1.4) compared to overall state general reVf:nues of 12.1 percent (3.2) as reported in the
Government Finances data. About half of this difference (3.3 percent) is due to state
transfers to local governments. The other major differences in these data are from spending
on capital projects and special fund finances.
21The governme'nt areas which are sampled with certainty are county governments with
population greater than 50,000; all municipal and township governments with more than 25,000
residents and all school district governments with enrollment greater than 5,000.
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4.2 The Effect of TELs on ~Jtate Revenues and Expenditures Using NA.SBO Data
Table 4 presents results using the NASBO data. These regressions use data from
1982-1990 and examine state general fund data only. Column 1 estimates a standard
reduced-form demand equation for state expenditures with an indicator variable for a
potentially binding limit on state expenditures or revenues.22 The resulting estimates show a
small, albeit insignificant effect of having a limit.23 The hypothesis that the OLS estimated
coefficient equals zero cannot be rejected at standard confidence intervals. Column 2
presents OLS estimates including state fixed effects. Once again the hypothesis of no effect
of state limits cannot be rejected.
The third column of Table 4 presents the IV estimates of the effect of 'fELs on state
expenditures using infonnation on direct legislation laws to address the endogeneity of
TELs. The IV resu:ts suggest a substantial neiatiye effect of state TELs on state general
fund expenditures. The estimated effect is large, with limits estimated to reduce state
spending by 2.1 percent (1.0) of personal income, or nearly 30 percent of state general fund
spending. This finding underscores the importance of recognizing the endogenous nature of
the imposition of state fiscal institutions. I explicitly test the importance of instrumenting by
including (1, the residual from the TEL linear probability model in the specification. The
22 Bergstrom and Goodman( 1973) and Borcherding and Deacon( 1972) are examples of
other work using this standard methodology.
23All regression results are presented with White (1980) standard errors. These have been
adjusted to allow for within state group correlation and between group heteroskedasticity. These
adjusted standard errors are two to five times larger than those reported using standard regression
techniques.
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coefficierat on (t is -.001 (.004) which is statistically different froln -.021, the estimated
coefficient on TELj,. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis of random assignment of
TELs across states at a 90 percent significance level.
The fourth column of Table 4 presents instrumental variable estimates using both
information on direct ,legislation rules and infonnation on voters' ability to recall elected
officials. The estimated effect decreases slightly to 2.0 percent (0.9).24 Including a second
instrument also allows us to explicitly test whether using these variables as instrunlents is
appropriate. Perfonning a test of the over-identifying restriction leads us to reject the IlUl1
hypothesis that the instruments belong directly in the spending equation. 25
Columns 5-8 present similar results for general fund revenues. lbe results are
almost identical to those found for general fund expenditures. The general fund, as defined
by state budget officers, excludes state transfers and is required to be in balance at the end of
the year in twenty-four states26• In OLS regressions, the state TELs are found to have a
small negative effect on general fund revenues. This result is reversed when state fixed
24 Comparing this IV specification to the OLS results in column 1, we can again reject the
hypothesis of random assigmnent of limits across states at a 95 percent significance level.
2STo test the direct explanatory power of the instmments in explaining the level of state
spending, I rurl a regression of the IV residuals on the instruments. Examining the NR2, from
this regression, we can r~ject the null hypothesis of the instruments directly affecting the level of
state spending. For this equation NR2 = .432.
26Every state except Vermont has some sort of balanced budget rule. Forty-four states
require that the governor submit a balanced budget, thirty-seven require the legislature pass a
balanced budget while twenty-four require that the end of year actual expenditure and revenue
values balance. Poterba (1995) discusses these balanced budget rules and summarizes recent
work on the effectiveness of the different limits.
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effects are included in the specification. The IV results (Table 4, Columns 7 and 8) suggest
a substantial negati\le effect of stAte TELs on state government revenues. The presence of a
binding limit decreases general fund revenues by 2.5 percent (1). Again, we can reject tile
null hypothesis of random assignment of limits across states at standard significance levels.
The remainder of the covariates in this equation are marginally significant. Given that
general funds are defined differently across states, nl0st of the variation within this panel is
across states and this dj,fference in definitions decreases the explanatory power of the
covariates. An increase in gross state product as a percent of personal income is correlated
with a greater than proportional increase in state spending. Higher ADA scores reflect more
liberal voters and are also correlated with higher spending and revenue. Finally, a higher
unemployment rate leads to an increase in state general fund spending. The signs on the
other covariates are not statistically different from zero. Although these variables are often
included in other studies, and are sometimes statistically significant~ the normalization of the
dependent variable by state personal income may help explail1 the divergence in findings of
significant effects of covariates in other studies and this study.
4.3 State TELs and Government Expenditures and Revenues:
Census of Governments Data
Table 5 presents estimates of the effect ofTELs on state and local general fund
expenditures; as noted above the defmition of state general expenditures is broader than that
used by NASBO and includes more categories of spending. This will allow us to test for
increases in non-covered expenditures by comparing the two sets of estimates. Regressions
also include the period before and after passage of these limits (1970-1991) for the 48
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continental states. Column 1, again, presents the results from a standard reduced fann
spending equation. The resulting estimate of the effect of the limit is negligible. Colwnn 2
presents OLS estimates including state fixed effects, and we again cannot reject the
hypothesis of no effect of state limits.
The third column of Table 5 presellts the instrumental variable estimates of the effect
of TELs on state expenditures using information on direct legislation laws to address the
endogeneity oCTELs. In contrast to the OLS results, and consistent with the NASBO data
results, t.~e IV results suggest a substantial nesati,'e effect of state TEl,s on state government
expenditures. The estimated effect is large, with limits estimated to reduce state spending by
1.8 percent (0.6) ofpersonal income. This is a slightly smaller effect than that found using
the NASaO data, but is not statistically different from that result27• Thus, there is little
evidence of state budget officials responding to binding TELs by transferring services and
responsibility to off-budget activity. I test and reject the hypothesis of random assignment
of limits across states. The signs on the other covariates are as expecied and do not change
direction when switching from OLS to IV estimation. If gross state product increases as a
percent of personal income, there is no corresponding increase in state spendi~lg. Higher
state population leads to a decrease in state spending as a percentage of personal income.
The percent of the population which is of school age is negatively related to the amount of
27Limiting the sample period of the regression to the same years covered by the NASBO
data produces a smaller, but not statlJtically different, decrease in the coefficient estimates in
state spending and revenue regressions. Therefore, 61ere is some evidence that TELs decrease
total state spending more in the period directly following passage and then become less
constraining as state governments move some budget items into non-covered areas. TIns linkage
warrants further investigation.
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state spending. If the school age population increased from fifteen to twenty percent of the
population this would lead to a decrease in state spending as a percent of personal income of
four-tenths of one percent. This decrease would be more than offset by a larger estimated
effect on local spending.
An inci·ease in federal funds leads to a more than one-for-one increase in state
expenditure. This is probably due to matching features in most federal aid programs. This
is significant evidence of a "fly-paperll effect that has been found by other researchers.
Hines and Thaler (1995) summarize recent studies of this effect. Higher average ADA
scores reflect more liberal voters, and are correlated with higher state spendillg. Finally, a
higher unemployment rate has little effect on state spending.
The last six columns ofTable 5 explore the effects of state limits on local
government spending. These regressions are estimated less precisely than the state
expenditure equations, with most of the variation occurring between states rather than over
time. The results in Columns 4-6 show that the OLS estimate of the effect of state limits on
local government spending is small and statistically not different from zero. n.e IV results,
which are shown in Column 6, suggest a small positive effect of limits on local spending,
with an estimated .5 percent increase in local spending. These results suggest that there is
some shifting of spending from state to localities when states enact TELs.28
28Using alternative instrument sets does not change the predicted effect of limits on state
expenditures. However, the choice of instrument set does affect the magnitude, but not the sign,
of the predicted effect of local governments. It is clear that some offset occurs although the
magnitude of this effect is not precisely known. Therefore, the effect of potentially binding state
TELs on aggregate state and local spending is unclear.
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The results in the last three columns Sl10W the effect of TELs on total state and local
spending. Not surprisingly, the OLS estimates are small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero. The IV estimate of the coefficient is negative but the hypothesis that this
coefficient is zero cannot be rejected at standard confidence intervals. The pattern of results
in Table 5 suggest that TELs reduce state level spending, but that approximately one third of
this reduction is offset by higher local spending. This suggests the importance of examining
total state and local spending even when analyzing state level institutions.
Table 6 presents regression results for state and local revenues, in contrast to
expenditures in Table 5. Again, there seems to be little effect of limits in the OLS
regressions presented in Column 1. Including state effects does ilot change this result.
When the endogeneity of limits is accounted for there again seems to be a negative (-1.9
percent) effect of limits on state general revenues.
This is very similar to the estimates of the effects of binding TELs on revenues found
in Table 4. This is some evidence that state governments are not reallocating revenues to
special funds and away from general funds in response to tax limits.
Columns 4-6 present similar results on the effect of state limits on local revenues.
Column 4 presents OIJS estimates and again there is little evidence of an effect of state TELs
on local revenues. The IV estimate is presented in Colwnn 6. There is evidence of a 1.5
percent (.9) increase in local general fund revenues.
Finally, 'in the last three columns of Table 6, I examine the effect of limits on total
state and local revenues. Again, the OLS estimate of the aggregate effect of limits is small
and not significantly different from zero~ The IV results (presented in Column 9) indicate
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that state limits on total state and local spending are associated with a small decrease in
spending. However, the aggregate effect ofTELs on total state and local revenue is again
not significantly different from zero.
4.4 Differ-ences Between Types of Limits
Table 7 examines the effect ofdifferent types ofTELs on state and local
expenditures and revenues. If there are differences between types of limits, this would lend
weight to the hypothesis that certain limits act as more than signals between voters and
elected officials, or that certain types of lintits are more binding than others.
Given the limited number of instrumental variables available, I cannot explore
differences in all the characteristics of TELs at once. Instead I look at pair-wise
comparisons ofdifferent traits. Since certain limit characteristics ure highly correlated,
attributing the entire effect to the studied trait would be misleading. For exanlple revenue
limits are more likely to be passed as citizen initiatives, so a stronger effect of revenue limits
could be reflecting an effect of citizen initiatives. The regression specifications include the
same set as covariates as those reported in Tables 5 and 6. The coefficients on the covariates
remain relatively constant over the different specifications i and are not reported in Table 7.
Since in almost all cases the OLS results are not statistically different from zero and the
hypothesis of random assignment of types of limits across states is rejected, I only pres~nt
results from the IV spec!fication.
The first set of estimates in Table 7 compares the effect on expenditures of limits
only on state governments versus limits on both state and local governments. The
coefficient on states with limits on both state and local governments measures the additional
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effect of limiting both state and local governments. Column 1 presents spending results;
states with binding limits spend 3.5 percent less than states with no limits. However, the
hypothesis that this effect is not statistically different from zero cannot be rejected. This
effect is smaller, but still negative, if the limit also extends to localities as well.
Colwnn 3 explores the effect of various limits on local spending. The regression
equations explain less of the variation in local spending than in state spending. Column 3
presents the IV results for local general fund spending. In states with state only limits~ locai
spending increases by 4.7 percent, a larger increase than the decrease in state level spendingo
IIowever, in states with both state and local limits, local spending is decreased by 3.6
percent. Column 5 shows the effect of limits on aggregate state and local spending. Column
5 reveals a positive, not significantly different from zero, effect of state only limits. In
contrast, states with both state and local limits have a lower level of aggregate spending.
Columns 2, 4 and 6 present similar results for total general revenues. The IV results
reveal that whjle there seems to be little effect of limits only on state governments, when
limits are extended to local governments, state general fund revenues are 3.6 percent smaller
than they otherwise would have been. This decrease in state total revenue is offset by a
small increase in local revenues, leading to an overall 2.1 percent decrease in state and local
revenues in states with limits on both state and local governments.
The next set of rows in Table 7 explore the different effects of revenue and
expenditure limits on state and local governments. Column 1 presents evidence on the effect
of revenue and expenditure limits on state spending. The results in column 1 suggest that
expenditure limits reduce state spending by 2.7 percent while revenue lilnits decrease state
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spending by only 1.2 percent. However, the null hypothesis of no difference in these two
coefficients cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels. The effect is different for local
spending; local spending decreases by 1.7 percent if a state revenue lirnit is in place,
although this estimate is not significantly different from zero, wIllie a state expenditlrre limit
leads to a 6.7 percent increase in local spending. Since revenue limits usually include state
tax revenues (including revenue which will be transferred to local governments), while
expenditure limits do not usually cover state financed local spending, this result is consistent
with a theory of states trying to circumvent limits by re-allocating the level of government at
which services are provided. Finally, the IV estimates in colwnn 5 suggest that the net
effect of revenue limits on state and local spending is to decrease the size of government by
2.9 percent while the corresponding effect of expenditure limits is to increase spending by
4.1 percent. The effect of revenue and expenditure limits on state and local re\ ~nues is
similar. Revenue limits seem to decrease both state and total state and local revenues by 2.4
percent while expenditure limits actually seem to increase revenue levels by 5.1 percent,
mostly at the local level. Thus revenue limits seem to have a much greater effect.
The third aspect of limits examined is whether the linlit in place is a statutoI]' or
constitutional limit. While the hypothesis of equal effects of both statutory and
constitutional limits on state revenues and expenditures CanIiot be rejected, the two types of
limits have notably different effects on the size of total state and local government.
Statutory limits lead to greater local spending while constitutional limits do not. This nlay
reflect the more narrow focus of statutory limits on state general fund spending, unlike
constitutioliallimits \vhich typically inc!ude provisions which restrict the shifting of
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responsibility of state programs to local governments.
s. Conclusions
This paper explores the effect of constitutional and legislative TELs on state and
local government spending over the last!\Vo decades. Currently twenty-four states have
laws limiting government appropriations or revenues. Prior work on this question has
produced little evidellce that these limits matter. However, studying the effect of TELs is
complicated by the potential endogeneity of these limits. The presence of these limits may
be correlated with voter preferences. Using historical infonnation on the availability of
direct legislation procedures as instrunlental variables for TELs, I find that state general
expenditure as a percent of personal income is two percent smaller in states \\rith limits. This
effect is partially offset by higher local spending in these states. In addition, the type of
limit seems to matter. Limits on both state and local governments produce greater reductions
in spending than state limits alone. Revenue limits appear more constraining than
expenditure limits, and constitutional limits appear to have a greater effect than statutory
limits.
In further work I plan to explore differences in the effects of limits on different types
of revenues and expenditures. The role of capital vs operating budgets clearly warrants
attention. In addition, it should be possible to study how different cOlnponcnts of the
operating budget are affected by different types of limits. In one example of this t)'pe of
analysis, Poterba and Rueben(1995) find that relative wages for workers in state and local
government grew more slowly in states with TELs in the 1979-1991 time period than in
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states without these limits. I hope to further explore the effects of these limits on public
sector workers by examining both total wage bills and the number of workers in the state
and local sector.
There is also further work to be done exploring how the local offset to the decrease in
state spending occurs. Local spending can increase in two ways; existing local governments
could spend more or there could be an increased number of local governments. The effects
of increased unfunded mandates are very different than the effects of a state creating and
funding more special districts to avoid TELs. There is also the issue of whether this shift '.11
government expenditure reflects an actual transfer of responsibility or just a transfer of
funding. Exploring the connections between state and local governments and the
constraining nature of these limits well become more important as the state!)' role in
providlllg government services increases in the next few years.
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Table 1: Information on States with TELs
Expenditure Revenue
Potelltially Non- Potentially Non-
Binding Binding Binding Binding
Citizen Proposed 3 0 4 0
Legislature Proposed 7 8 0 I
Statutory 4 6 2 1
Constitutional 7 2 2 0
Local Limit Included 3 1 2 0
InTEL
Need to Adjust Limit 6 2 3 0
If Switch Spending
Responsibility
Notes: Missouri has both a revenue and an expenditure limit. South Carolina passed a statutory
limit in 1980, which was made part of the constitution in 1984. Non-binding limits are those
which are purely advisory or only require a legislative majority to override or amend.
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Table 2: State and Local Government Reduced Fonn Regressions, 1961-1977 and 1978-1992
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Revenue Revenue Revenue
1961-1977 1978-1992 1961-1977 1978-1992
Direct -65.84 -28.14 -104.37 -70.11 -15~65 -127.82
Legislation (33.75) (32.43) (40.77) (33.79) (32.33) (45.83)
Per Capita 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13
Income (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population I -0.21 1.26 -1.81 3.10 6.62 -0.01
(5.20) (6.59) (4.32) (4.16) (5.40) (3.41)
Federal Grants I 2.24 2.03 2.55 2.60 2.04 3.19
Received (0.08) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.24)
No.Obs. 11536 816 720 1536 816 720
.9011 .9046 .9294 .9296 .9020Adj. R-Squared .9281
Regression results exclude Alaska and Hawaii, and measure per capita state and local revenues and spending in 1982 dollars. Annual
indicator variabes and nine regional variables are also included. Data is from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted to allow for correlation within-state groups and between group
heteroscedasticity.
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Table 3: Linear Probability Models of States Having Binding Tax or Expenditure Limits
Instruments Including Regression
Only Covariates
Direct .161 .121 .145 .111







Change in .422 .185
Population (.670) (.577)
% Population 2.206 2.122
5-17 (2.689) (2.388)
% Population -.267 .043
Over 65 ( 1.642) (1.612)
Federal Grants -1.968 -1.443
(2.486) (2.374)
ADA .033 -.015
House Score (.092) (.089)
Unemployment 1.497 1.028
Rate ( 1.164) (1.075)
Adj. R-Squared .1363 .1671 .1673 .1975
Regressions exclude Alaska and Hawaii and include year indicator variables. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are adjusted to allow for within state-group correlation and between group
heteroscedasticity. Non-indicator variables are normalized by state personal income.
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Table 4: The Effect of Binding State Limits on State Spending and Revenues from General Fund, Using NASBO Data
State General Fund Spendin~ State General Fund Reyenues
OLS Fixed IV Alternate OLS Fixed IV Alternate
Effects IV Effects IV
Binding State Limit -.003 .005 -.021 -.020 -.004 .005 -.025 -.022
(.004) (.005) (.010) (.009) (.004) (.OOS) (.0 I0) (.009)
Gross State Product .023 .035 .012 .013 .028 .015 .016 .017
(.017) (.013) (.017) (.017) (.014) (.007) (.015) (.016)
Population .111 .143 .187 .269 .064 -.Oi6 -.042 -.030
(.2i3) (.182) (.210) (.] 98) (.216) (.146) (.208) (.196)
Change in Population -.007 -.072 .024 .021 -.0]4 -.020 .021 .017
(.042) (.023) (.037) (.039) (.041 ) (.020) (.034) (.036)
% Fop School Age -.016 -.252 .089 .080 .038 -.047 .157 .144
(.193) (.121 ) (.200) (.185) (.174) (.093) (.175) (.158)
0/0 Pop Over 65 -.098 ·.517 -.106 ·.105 -.083 -.337 -.092 -.091
(.114) (.190) (.098) (.097) (.116) (.154) (.096) (.096)
Federal Gr&nts .107 .280 .113 .112 .060 .330 .067 .066
(.265) (.101) (.276) (.282) (.231 ) (.10]) (.243) (.247)
House ADA Score .034 .006 .037 .037 .033 .003 .036 .036
(.010) (.003) (.009) (.U10) (.009) (.003) (.009) (.009)
Unemployment Rate .061 .056 .134 .128 .077 .040 .160 .) 51
(.086) (.035) (.075) (.070) (.083) (.027) (~07S) (.070)
Adj R-Squared .2234 .9129 393.80 7.82 .2410 .9263 379.60 8.29
51
Notes for Table 4: Regression equat~ons include annual indic.ator variables for 1982-1990. There are 9 annual observations for the 48 continental
states. Standard errors are reported in parentheses end have been adjusted to allow for within-state correlation and heteorskedaticity between
groups. Variables are measured as a percent of state personal income. Fixed effects specifications include individual state-fixed eff~cts. Data is
from National A:;sociation of Stat: Budget Officers "Fiscal Survey of the States". For IV estimates F-statistics (18, 413) are presented instead of
R-squared measures. Th~ IV specification uses direct legislation information to instrument for the presence of a TEL. The alternate IV
specification also includes information on voter's ability to recell elected officials.
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Table 5: The Effect of Binding State Limits on State and Local Spending, Bureau of the Census Data
State SDendin2 Local Snendin2 State and Local Spendios
OLS Fixed IV OLS Fixed IV OLS Fixed IV
Effects Effects Effects
Binding State .001 .000 -.018 .001 -.002 .005 .002 -.001 -.012
Limit (.003) (.002) (.006) (.005) (.002) (.010) (.005) (.003) (.009)
Gross State -.025 -.003 -.050 .368 -.015 .373 .343 -.018 .324
Product (.066) (.060) (.060) (..090) (.111 ) (.090) (.059) (.132) (.064)
Population -.]38 -.019 -.122 .126 .064 .122 -.011 .045 .000
(.023) (.071) (.025) (.060) (.119) (.060) (.053) (.088) (.055)
Change in -.024 .006 -.009 .039 -.076 .035 .014 -.071 .027
Population (.018) (.028) (.028) (.050) (.035) (.056) (.045) (.053) (.049)
% Pop School -.135 -.J06 -.089 .477 .110 .467 .342 .004 .378
Age (.100) (.106) (.042) (.171 ) (.111 ) (.215) (.123) (.151) (.15S)
% Pop Over 65 -.126 .145 -.132 .241 ...472 .242 .114 -.326 .109
(.085) (.~28) (.031 ) (.114) (.241 ) {.123) (.099) (.372) (.041 )
Federal Grants 1.429 .926 1.378 .504 .242 .516 1.933 1.168 1.893
(.131 ) (.188) (.045) (.224) (.282) (.254) (.192) (.427) (.202)
House ADA .011 .002 .014 -.004 -.009 -.005 .007 -.007 .009
Score (.004) (.004) (.004) (.010) (.006) (.011 ) (.008) (.009) (.010)
Unemployment .020 .043 .046 .145 .186 .139 .165 .229 .186
Rate (.047) (.050) (.064) (.075) (.039) (.087) (.061 ) (.062) (.067)
Adj R-Squared .7517 .9175 84.69 .3391 .8680 18.68 .6901 .8721 73.03
53
Table 6: The Effect of Binding State Limits on State and Local Revenues, Bureau of the Census Data
State Reyenues Local Reyenyes State and Local ReYenues
OLS Fixed IV OLS Fixed IV OLS Fixed IV
Effects Effects Effects
Binding State .000 .001 -.019 -.000 -.004 .015 .000 -.002 -.004
Limit (.004) (.002) (.008) (.004) (.003) (.009) (.005) (.004) (.009)
Gross State -.250 -.]68 .225 .330 -.092 .349 .580 .260 .574
Product (.057) (.119) (.068) (.089) (.102) (.090) (.083) (.211 ) (.087)
Population .066 -.185 -.050 .065 .039 .052 -.001 -.146 .002
(.030) (.107) (.025) (.042) (.144) (.060) (.043) (.094) (.05S)
Change in -.014 -.060 .003 .003 -.044 -.010 -.010 -.104 -.007
Population (.032) (.045) (.023) (.032) (.018) (.030) (.048) (.051) (.015)
% Pop School .172 .022 .222 .311 .188 .273 .483 .210 .494
Age (.131 ) (.112) (.053) (.103) (.083) (.128) (.139) (.167) (.OS8)
% Pop Over 65 -.016 -.147 -.022 .233 -.264 .238 .217 -.411 .216
(.105) (.301) (.038) (.O99) (.196) (.100) (.106) (.449) (.042)
Federal Grants 1.989 1.314 1.935 .250 .160 .292 2.239 1.475 2.227
(.135) (.385) (.160) (.179) (.224) (.204) (.185) (.595) (.202)
House ADA .002 -.009 .005 -.003 -.007 -.005 -.000 -.015 -.000
Score (.006) (.007) (.003) (.007) (.004) (.008) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Unemployment .109 .012 .137 .009 .171 -.013 .118 .J 83 .124
Rate (.076) (.046) (.064) (.069) (.038) (.087) (.074) (.070) (.033)
Adj R-Squared .7460 .9229 88.52 .2864 .8310 13.56 .7457 .8772 102.00
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Notes for Table 5 and 6: Regression equations include annual indicator variables for 1970-1990. There are 1006 state-year observations for the
48 continental states. Variables are measured as a percent of state personal income. Fixed effects specifications include individual state-fixed
effects. Data is from the Bureau of the Census "Government Finances" and "State Government Finances". For IV estimates F-statistics (30,975)
are presented instead of R-Squared measures. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are adjusted to allow for within state correlation and
between state heteroskedasticity. IV regressions use direct legislation rules as an instrument for the presence of TELs.
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Table 7: The Effects of Different Types of Limits on State and Local Government
Sta~eneral F~~cl Local General Fund State and Local
General Fund
Spending Revenues Spending Revenues Spending Revenues
-
rmrrv
State Limits ...035 .008 .047 -.009 .010 -.001
(~O28) (.010) (.014) (.011 ) (.012) (.010)
TEL extends to .025 -.044 -.083 .021 -.044 -.021
Localities (.014) (.022) (.029) (.022) (.024) (.015)
F-Statistics 59.91 76.72 8.37 4.90 .6119 92.22
Binding Revenue -.012 -.020 -.017 -.006 -.029 -.024
Limit (.008) (.008) (.014) (.011 ) (.011 ) (.013)
Binding -.027 ·.001 .067 .048 .041 .051
Expenditure Limit (.007) (.007) (.012) (.010) (.010) (.011)
F-Statistics 67.37 98.16 7.06 4.53 46.61 41.10
Constitutional ·.013 -.017 -.057 -.052 -.070 ...021
Limit (.01 ]) (.011 ) (.037) (.030) (.033) (.289)
Statutory Limit -.035 -.004 .185 .139 .150 .048
(.016) (.016) (.054) (.045) (.049) (.660)
F-Statistics .6320 .7348 2.24 18.89 i 1.34 58.40
Note: Regressions are run with the same covariates found in Tables 5 and 6 Instrumental variable results are presented, where the different types
of limits are instrumented for using direct legislation rules and information on voters ability to recall elected officials. Variables are measured as
a percent of state personal income. The effect of the types of limits hav~ been estimated in grouped pairs. Data is from the Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census "Government Finances" and '~State Government Finunces". F-statistics (30,975) are presented.
56









Olllew...... 6 ........ 0,..,....
.2J .21
.18 .&IS
.1 tSJ raO~ .1~Cfli .175.17'J ... 068 44 6 of[&jJdJ: 6








































States with Tax and/or Expenditure Limits
DNa TEXL
~ Passed Before '982
III Passed Between 1982-1989
II Passed 1991 or Laler




• Possibly Restrictive TEL
58
Figure 3:
States With Direct Referendum
irect Le islation
o No Direct Referenda Procedure
~ Referenda Only
II Referenda and Initiative
II Passed After 1930
Figure 4:





Appendix A: List of Adoption Dates of Tax and Expenditure Limits
State Year Type of Limit Need Superrnajority or Referendum for Waiver
Binding
AK 1982 6Exp < ~CPI +~ Pop 3/4 of legislators and voter referenda
Binding Const, Legis Ref
AZ 1978 Approp<7% of State Personal Income(PI), Canst, Legis 2/3 of each house
Binding Ref
CA 1979 ~Exp < ~CPI +l\ Pop Can exceed but need to pay back following years
Binding Cons;; Cit Init, Local Limit
CO 1977 ~Exp<7% of State PI, Stat, Legis Binding rule passed in 1991
CT 1~91 aExp< Max of 5% or S-year average of PI or CPI growth 3/5 of each house and governor declares
rate emergency
FL 1994 Growth rate of PI 2/3 of each house
HI 1978 dApp<A Plover past 3 years 2/3 of each house
Binding Canst,
ID 1980 Exp<5.33% of State PI 2/3 of each house
Binding Stat, Local Limit
LA 1979 6 Tax Rev<~PI, Stat, Legis In 1991 need 2/3 each house
MA 1986 aRev<~ wage & salaries past 3 years
Binding Stat, Initiative, Local Limit
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Appendix A: List of Adoption Dates of Tax and Expenditure Limits (Cont.)
State Year Type of Limit on Growth
MI 1978 ~Rev<~PI last year or past 3 yrs
Binding Const, Cit Init, Local Limit
MO 1980 ~Rev & &Exp<l1PI last year or past 3 vrs, Canst, Cit Init
Binding
fvlT 1981 ~Exp<a wage & salaries past 3 yrs
Binding Stat, Legis
NV 1979 l-+'~Gov Proposed Exp«l+Apop)(I+&Inf)
Stat, Legis
NJ 1976 .1Exp<L\PI, Stat, Legis, Local Limit
Binding
NM !987 dGov Prapo~edExp <6. wages & salaries, Stat, Legis
NC 1991 Less Than 7% personal Income
OK 1985 ~Exp<12%, Canst, Board of Equalization
Binding
OR 1979 ~Exp<~ PI over ~rior 2 y~ars
Stat, Legis Vote
RI 1977 ~Govemor's Prop Exp<6% Stat, Legis
SC 1980 LiExp < d PI or, Exp< 9.5% PI
Binding Stat 80, Canst 84, Legis
TN 1978 aExp<~ in PI, Const, Canst Conv Ref
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Need Supennajority or Ref for Waiver
2/3 of each house and governor declares
emergency
2/3 of each house and governor declares
emergency
2/3 of each house and governor declares
emergency
1994 Binding Law Passed
expired in 1983
Not Binding
2/3 majority of legislature, every 5 years
legislature can review limit.
Appendix A: List of Adoption Dates of Tax and Expenditure Limits (Cont.)
State Year Type of Limit on Growth
TX 1978 ~Exp<a in PI, Const, Legis Ref
UT 1979 .1E.xp<.85 ~PI, Stat, Legis
Not Implemented
WA 1979 ~Rev<L\ Avg Plover prior 3 years
Binding Stat, Cit Init
Need Supennajority or Ref for Waiver
2/3 majority of legislature
2/3 majority of legislature
Source: Infonnation taken from "Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism" Volume 1: 1992 ACIR;"State Tax and Expenditure Limits: There is
No Story", National Association of State Budget Officers 1988 and augmented with information from newspapers and other primary sources.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Institutions and Public Sector Labor Marl{ets
Joint with Jim Poterba, MIT
Total compensation for state and local government workers in the United States rose
ten percent faster than that for civilian workers between 1982 and 1993. These statistics
ha",e sparked a public policy debate on the role of public sector pay increases in contributing
to the fiscal problems of state and locaJ governments during this period, and more generally
(In compensation policy in the public sector.29 Much of this debate has proceeded without
regard to a voluminous literature in labor economics, surveyed by Ehrenberg and Sch,varz
(1986) and recently extended by Katz and Krueger (1991), on the pay premium associated
with working in the public rather than the private sector. Ehrenberg and Smith (1994)
stl.I1Ul1arize these studies as suggesting a public sector wage premium for women, and a
small wage penalty for men. Katz and Krueger (1991) find that poorly-educated workers
enjoyed a growing public sector wage premium during the 1980s, while better-educated
workers faced a shrinking public sector premium.
While there has been substantial discussion of aggregate trends in relative pay in the
public and private sectors, differences across jurisdictions in this pay relationship have
received less attention. This paper contributes to this gap, focusing in particular on the
effect of fiscal institutions on the public sector-private sector wage differential. The paper is
29Examp~es of recent policy discussions focusing on this issue include Cox and Brunelli
(1992), who attribute fiscal stress to rising public sector pay, and Belman and Heyward (1992),
who argue that wages in the public sector are insignificantly different from those in the private
sector.
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divided into five sections. Section one describes the variation across jurisdictions in the
public sector wage premium. Section two summarizes variation in the fiscal environment,
particularly the nature of tax and expenditure limits that affect state and local spending,
across states. The third section presents evidence on the correlation between property tax
limits, and state tax or expenditure limits, and the growth rate of public sector wages during
the 1979-1991 period. We fmd that states with such limits exhibit slower growth in public
sector wages, relative to private sector wages, than states without such limits. Section four
discusses the potential endogeneity of fiscal institutions, and reports instrumental \'ariable
results that rely on aspects of the state legislative environment to instrument for fiscal
institutions. A brief conclusion suggests directions for further work.
1. Spatial Heterogeneity in tbe Public Sector Wage Premium
There is substantial heterogeneity across states in the magnitude of the wage
differential between observationally-comparable public sector and private sector employees.
1bree previous studies have explored the geographic differences in the public sector wage
premiwn. Borjas (1986) uses data from the 1980 Census to estimate state-specific wage
premia for several large states. He then attempts to explain these findings in a model of
public demwld for government services. Katz and Krueger (1991) plot public sector versus
private sector wage levels across states, implicitly showing heterogeneity in the relative
public s~ctorwage, although they do not explore the source of these differences. Gyourko
and Tracy (1991), whose analysis is most similar to that reported below, examine data on
workers from a cross-section of SMSAs drawn from the 1980 Census of Population, and
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find that the~ of public sector wages is lower in SMSAs tlUtt are affected by tax or
expenditure limits. They also consider '/ariables that affect the bar6aining environment
between Pllblic sector workers and local governments.
We estimate interstate differenc~s in the public sector wage premium in a standard
Current Population Survey-based wage equation.30 Our wage equation relates the logarithm
of an individual's hourly wage, In(wiJ, to a set of individual characteristics (Xil) that can
affect marginal productivity, an indicator variable (SLGOViJ for working in the public
sector, and state effects interacted with this indicator variable. The eq'jation also includes
state effects to control for interstate differences in wage patterns that affect both the private
and public sectors.
The set of individual characteristics in our wage equation includes education,
experience (age - education - 6), marital status, race, residence in an SMSA, as well as an
indicator variable fer part-time employment. We allow education to affect wages through a
set of four categorical variables (EDUC) for number of years of schooling, corresponding to
less than twelve years, twelve years, which typically corresponds to completing high school,
thirteen to fifteen years, sixteen years, which typically corresponds to completing college,
and more than sixteen years. The wage equation includes quartic powers of experience. We
also include a set of control variables for ten broad occupational classifications, such as
30Moore and Ne'NIllan (1991) summarize the previous literature that has used individual-
level wage equations to evaluate the public sector wage premium. They also note that since
wage equations estimated on individual data typically lack information on precise job
characteristics, there may be omitted factors, such as the riskiness of some types of public sector
jobs, that contribute to wage differentials.
65
managerial and technical, sales, or crafts, in some equations.3• Ioe resulting equation is:
In w = X P + .p.., (a. + SLGOV. *o.'*STATE. + E
it It I k JI JI)I' Ijl It
STATEjjl is an indicator variable for worker i, in year t, residing in state j. We focus on
(I)
interstate differences in the conditional means of the public and private wage distributions.
We have also estimated state effects using quantile regression methods, and the differences
across states in the resulting fixed effects coefficients are very similar to those from the least
squares equations.
We estimate (1) using data from the merged outgoing rotation groups in the CPS for
the years 1979-1992.32 We exclude self-employed individuals from our analysis, because it
is difficult to measure their wage rates. We also exclude federal government employees,
because they are neither private sector nor state and local government employees.33 We
estimate equation (1) separately for men and women.
State effects interacted with the public sector indicator variable substantially improve
31The set of variables included in this wage equation is similar to that in Katz and Krueger
(1991, 1992), although our approach is somewhat different. They estimate separate wage
equations for workers in the public and private sectors, and then predict average wages in eacll
sector for hypothetical workers with fixed characteristics. We estimate a single wage equatioll
each year for all men, and all women, and impose the same coefficient vector P. for the private
and public sectors.
32Changes in the CPS in 1992 make it impossible to estimate the same wage equation on
pre- and post-1992 data. We discuss this issue in more detail in the appendix.
33Ifwe include federal employees, and allow a separate average wage premium for these
workers, our results on the relative wages of state-local government and private sector employees
are not affected. The average wage premium for federal workers, relative to private sector
workers, is positive.
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the explanatory power of the estimated wage equations. When we estimate a wage equation
pooling the outgoing rotation groups in the 1990 and 1991 CPS data files, for example,
adding state effects in this interactive way raises adjusted R2 from .398 to .427 for men, and
from .345 to .389 for women.34 Moreover, the estimated coefficients reveal substantial
differences in relative wages in different states. Figure 1 plots the distribution of estimated
state-specific state and local wage premia for 1990/1991. The dark shaded bars SllOW the
estimated public sector wage premia for men, while the lighter shaded bars describe the
distribution for women. The figure shows that for men, th.e public sector premium exceeds
.10 in only one state, while it falls below -.15 in two states. Most states are concentrated
between premia of -.10 and O. For women, the distribution of state premia is right-shifted
relative to that for men. In six states, the estimated premiwn is above .1 0, and only two
states have negative estimated premia.3s
State-specific public sector wage premia also display substantial persistence over
time. Figure 2a shows the scatter-plot of the state-specific wage premium for men estimated
from the 1979/80 CPS data, and the corresponding estimate of the state-specific premium
from 1990/91. Figure 2b presents an analogous scatter-plot of the estimated wage premia
for women. Both figures show strong positive correlation between the estimated premia at
the beginning of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. For men, the correlation of the
34We pool consecutive years of the CPS data to increase our sample size for individual
states.
35The estimates of state-specific wage premia are from equations that exclude occupation
indicator variables. Including these variables affected the level, but not the pattern, of the state-
specific wage premia.
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forty-eight state effects is .63, while for wome~ the correlation is .62. Even though these
correlations are positive, there is evidence of regression toward the national mean wage
premium.
Figures 2a and 2b identify individual state observations by their two-letter
abbreviations, so they also provide infonnation on which states have high, and low, public
sector wage premia. For men, California shows the highest premium in 1990/91, followed
by New York, Florida, Arizona, and Connecticut. The states with the lowest wage premium
for men are West Virginia, Utah, Kansas, Wyoming, and New Hampshire. There is only a
weak correlation (p = .35) between the estimated premium for men and women.
l~able 1 presents infonnation on the estimated state and local government wage
premia for the twelve largest state~ in 1990. These are the states for which the CPS data
provide the most precisely estimated OJ,1979110 and OJ,I990I9I. The point estimates show
substantial and statistically significant changes in relative wage premia for several states. In
California, for example, the estimated premium for men increases 14.8% during the twelve
year period, althOl1gh there is relatively little change for women. In New York, the
estimated premia for both men and women increase during the 19805. In only one of tllese
twelve states, North Carolina, do men experience a decline in the estimated public sector
wage premium during this period. In contrast, the premium for women declines in five of
the twelve states.
The absence of any association betv.reen the outlying state wage premia in various
years is likely to reflect both measurement error in the estimated effects, and genuine shifts
in relative wage premia. The standard deviation of the chanKe in the state wage premiwn
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between 1979/80 and 1990/91 is .Oi,·:; for men, and .042 for women. The average standard
deviation of the estimated state-s}1ecific coefficients in the two years is .028 for men and
.023 for women~ Measurement error alone would therefore predict a standard deviation of
the change of .040 for men, and .033 for ",·omen.36 For larger states with greater samples in
the CPS, however, the state effects are estimated much more precisely. The standard
deviations of the New York and California effects for 1990/91, for example, are .012 and
.0 I3 respectively.
Before considering explanations of state variation in the public sector wage
premium, we should note one difficulty with our focus on wages rather than total
compensation in the two sectors. Public sector workers often receive more generous benefits
packages than their private sector counterp~rts. Our aIlalysis focuses on wages, and
therefore does not precisely measure the total compellsation received by workers in the two
sectors. Time series evidence, however, suggests that relative compensation and relative
wages in the two sectors move closely together. Data from the Employment Cost Index
(Eel) indicate that in 1993, benefit costs averaged 43.8% of wage costs for public sector
workers, and 40.3% for those in the private sector. Between 1981 and 1994, wages and
salaries grew 93.1 % in tile public sector, and 74.0% in the private sector. Over the same
period, total compensation costs grew 104.2% in the public sector, and 84.2% in the private
sector. Thus, both wage and non-wage compensation increased faster for public sector than
private sector workers. The difference in wage growth is similar to me difference in total
36If the two estimates of the state effects are independent, then the valiance of their
difference is just twice the own variance.
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compensation gro~which while not dispositive, suggests that focusing exclllSively 0,1 the
detenninants <'f relative~ levels in the public and private sectors should capture the
broad compensation trends in the two sectors.
2. State Fiscal Limits and Labor Organizing Prrovi.~ions: Institutional Variation
One potential explanation for differences il~ the relative public and private sector
wage across states rela.tes to differences in the illstitutional environment in which public
sector wages ilre detennined. Fiscal institutions are one source of su~h differences~state
labor laws relating to public sector unionization are another. A nwnber of previous studies
have investigated the link between collective bargaining institutions and wages, but, with the
notable exception of Gyourko and Tracy (1991), there has been relatively little previous
work on fiscal institutiOllS and public sector wages.
There is a small but growing literature on the effects of fiscal institutions on the level
of state and local government spending. Examples include Abrams arid Dougan (1986),
Ichniowski and Preston (1991), and Ruehen (1995). Ehrenberg (1979) presents a theoretical
discussion of how tax and expenditure limits could affe~t relative wages in the public and
private sectors. He argues that such laws could reduce the demand for public sector labor,
he observes that they may also reduce the supply of labor to this sector, 3..') potential
enlployees conclude that public sector jobs are prospectively less attractive. "The net effect
of these laws is therefore ambiguous a priori.
We focus on two types of fiscal institutions: overall limits on state or state and local
taxes or expenditures, a!ld limits on local property tax collections. Rueben (1995) presents
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more detail on the nature of these limits, and explores how these limits affect total state and
local government spending. Our analysis relies on her classification of both types of limits.
Further information on the variation in fiscal institutions across states may be found in tIle
A.dvisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1987) and the National Association of
State Budget Officers (1991) summaries of these rules.
We define a tax and expenditure limit variable as the fraction of the 1979-1991
period during which the state exhibited such a fiscal limit. We classify states as 11aving
limits if the ACIR (1987) indicates that they have a limit that actually constrains spending
decisions. States with purely "advisory" limits are excluded from this category. Most of the
states with such limits enacted them in the 1979-1981 period. Figure 3a shows the pattern of
such limitation laws during our sample period. Seventeen states are classified as having
limits at some point in the sample period by this definition; thirteen states ha\'e such limits
for the entire 1979-1991 pe~od. In our analysis below, we use an indicator variable equal to
unity for states with tax limits in force for the whole 1979-1991 period, zero for states with
no tax limits, and we construct values between 0 and 1 for those states that adopted tax
limits during this period.
With respect to property tax limits, we consider two sets of criteria for states into the
limit category. The first, and broader, definition, sets an indicator variable for property tax
limits equal to unity if the state has any type of limit on property tax collections. Many such
limits date from the 1930s, and are unlikely to bind during our sample period. The second
definition sets an indicator variable equal to unity only for those states that enacted property
tax limits after 1970. These limits were part of the "taxpayer revolt ll of the late 1970s, and
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are much more likely to have placed hUlding limits on local property tax collections. By the
first definition, thirty-eight continental states have property tax limits. The second and more
limited definition yields twenty-four states with property tax limits. Figure 3b shows the
pattern of states with property tax limits.
In addition to fiscal illstitutions, we also consider labor market institutions that affect
the bargaining power of public sector employees. We use two variables to measure these
institutions. '[he fITst is an indicator variable for the presence of public sector right-to-work
laws, and the second is Valletta and Freeman's (1988) IIsummary bargaining environment
statistic. II This variable, which is based on rules in place in 1984, combines information on
many aspects of state pl\blic sector labor legislation. Higher values of this variable
correspond to more pro-labor legislation.37
3. Empirical Results on Institutional Variation and Wage Patterns
Our analysis of how various institutions affects wages in the public sector
concentrates on the chanie in relative wages between 1979 and 1991, rather than the level of
wages in either year. We focus on changes because the level is likely to be affected by
current as well as historical factors that may be difficult to measure. For example, the wage
differential may be different in a state that recently adopted rigllt-to-work laws for the public
37Freeman and Valetta (1988) and Zax and Ichniowski (1990) find that pro-labor
legislation increases the probability that public sector workers will be represented by a union.
Ichniowski and Zax (1991) study the effects of right-ta-work laws on union representation.
Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) survey the voluminous literature on the relationship between
union representation and public sector wages, which generally suggests that such representation
raises wages.
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sector than in a comparable state that has had similar legislation for several decades.
We asswne that the state and local government wage premium in state j in 1991 can
be written as a function of the correspo.nding state premium in 1979, and a variety of
institutional factors. We therefore estimate equation (1) with tIle following modification to
the specification of the coefficients on the state and local sector dwnmy:
0° 1991 = 0- 19791, 1, ek *IMSTkj . (2)
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (2). We report only the coefficients on
110W the variables such as fiscal limits and bargaining environment affect the cbanae in the
state-specific public sector wage premium between 1979 and 1991. We present separate
estimates of wage equations for men and women. This allows us to estimate separate state
effects for the level of wages, and the level of the state and local wage premium, for men and
women in different states. We report several different specifications for both men and
women.
The specification in the first column of Table 2 includes only the fiscal limitation
variables in explaining the cross-state patterns of public sector wage premia. For both men
and women, the results suggest that fiscal limits reduce the relative growth of public sector
wages. A state with such a tax or expenditure limit in effecl for the fuli twelve years of our
sample period is predicted to experience a 4% decline in relative public. sector vs. private
sector wages for men, and a 1.30/0 (statistically indistinguishable from zero) decline for
women. The effects of property tax limits are even more pronounced, with a ..3.90/0 effect on
men's \vages and -4.5% for women. Both of these effects are statistically significatlt at
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standard confidence levels. The larger estimated effect of property tax limits on women's
wages may reflect the greater presence of women in teaching, w~jch is locally-financed.
The specification in the second column of T1able 2 distinguishes recently enacted
property tax limits from all limits; the results do not suggest substantial differences between
these groups of states. The third specification includes the average unemployment rate in
each state during our sample period, and finds that higher unemployment rates lower the
relative wage of public sector workers. This could reflect a composition effect, with lower
paid private sector workers losing jobs in economic do\vntums while comparable public
sector workers are not laid off, or it could reflect economic pressures on the public sector
bargaining process.
The specifications ill the last two rows of Table 2 inc.Iude the variables for collective
bargaining institutions as well as the indicators for fiscal institutions. These labor market
institutions have statistically significa.'1t effects on the relative growth of public and private
sector wages. States with more generous legislative environments for public sector
collective bargaining experience more rapid wage growth, while relative public sector wages
grew more slowly in states with right to work laws. As for the case of tax limitation laws,
the effects are substantively large: a right to work law is estimated to reduce public sector
relative wage growth by as much as 7.5% for men, and 6.40/0 for women, during an eleven-
year period.
Our analysis has focused on the~~ in the public sector wage premium between
1979 and 1991, but we can also ask whether the Ul of the wage premiwn IS affected by
either fiscal or bargaining institutions. Table 3 presents results relating the level of the wage
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premium in 1979/80 to the variables we considered in Table 2. We find a positive
association between the level of the wage premium and state-level tax or expenditure limits
for both men and women~. but no relationship between the wage premium and the presence
of property tax limits. We partly interpret this as evidence on the determinants of passage of
these limits: voters in states with higher public sector wages may have found it more
attractive to enact spending limits to reign in public sector labor costs.
The results in Table 3 do not suggest any relationship bet\veen right to work laws
and the level of public sector wages in 1979, although the substantial negative effect on the
1979-1991 change implies that cross-sectional regressions estimated for the 1991 sample
WQuid show significant negative level effects. OUf indicator variable for the generosity of
the public sector bargaining environment suggests that public sector wages are higher in
1979 in states with a more favorable environment~ and that they grew more rapidly during
the ensuing decade.
A central question of interpretation with both the level and change results is whether
fiscal and labor market institutions are proxying for differences across states in the attitude
of voters toward the public sector in general and public sector workers in particular. l'he
results from the 1979 level regressions do not support such explanations for the effects of
fiscal limits: states with such limits have higher, not lower, public sector wages in 1979,
while the "heterogeneous public sector tolerance" model would suggest that lower wages
would be expected in light of the results on 1979-1991 changes. Only one set of results,
those for the collective bargaining index variable, support the hypothesis that states with
more generous views toward public sector workers enact such legislation and therefore grant
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higher wage increases during the 1979-1991 period.
4. Addressing the Endogeneity of Fiscal Institutions
Studying the levels as well as the changes of public sector relative wages can provide
a check on some endogeneity explanations for the passage of state and local tax limits. An
alternative strategy for exploring this issue, however, involves searching for instrumental
variables that may be correlated with the passage of tax and expenditure limits, but which
will not directly influence relative public sector wages. This is the strategy that Rueben
(1995) employs in her analysis of how state tax and expenditure limits affect the growth rate
of state spending.
We consider two institutional variables that can affect the likelihood of enacting a tax
or expenditure limit: whether Lite state constitution permits state-wide referenda to enact
legislation (so-called "direct legislation ll states), and whether voters can recall elected
officials. It is sometimes argued that grass-roots campaigns lead to support among voters for
tax and expenditure limits, but that such support is much more difficult to generate in elected
legislatures. If this is the case, then the direct legislation variable should affect the changes
of enacting a tax or spending Ii-mit. Similarly, one can argue that recall provisions increase
the degree to which elected officials are responsive to voter preferences, and thereby affect
the probability that legislatures will enact tax or expenditure limits, conditional on a level of
voter support for such measures.
The results in Table 4 are instrumental variables estimates of linear regression
models like those in Table 2, in which characteristics of the state fiscal environment are
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enacted with state indicator variables to explain the change from 1979/80 to 1990/91 in the
relative public sector wage premiwn. We now estimate these models using 2SLS, witll hVQ
instrumental variables (direct referenda and recall) and two endogenous variables, the state
tax and expenditure limit ,'ariable and the property tax limit variable.
The coefficient estimates in Table 4 follow the same broad pattern as those in Table
3, but the absolute value of the coefficients on the tax and expenditure limit variables is
typically greater than that for the variables in Table 2. For property tax limits, for example,
the 2SLS estimate of the effect on wages for men is -6.30/0, and for women the estimated
effect is -14.2%. This is a substantial change relative to -4.2% and -5.6% in the ordinary
least squares estimates. The impact of state tax and expenditure limits is also increased
when the model is estimated by instrumental variables.
These findings support the earlier results, and provide at least some evidence against
the possibility that the ordinary least squares results are simply the result of endogenous
fiscal institutions.
5. Conclusions
This paper has presented suggestive evidence on the link between tax and
expenditure limits, and the public sector bargaining environment, and the evolution of public
sector wages. The results imply that the rate of growth of public sector wages, by
comparison to private sector wages, is slower in states with more restrictive fiscal
environments, and in states with less favorable environments for public sector unions. These
results raise an obvious question about the extrapolation of these results over long time
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periods. If the wages in one sector grow more slowly than wages in another sector for an
extended period, then the slow-growth sector will contract and eventually vanish.. Our
results may therefore be describing the adjustment to changes in the fiscal environment
during the 1970s and 19805, rather than pennanent effects of fiscal variables.
We have not considered the potential selection biases that plague studies of inter-
sectoral wage differences, whether between the public and private sectors or the union and
non-union s~ctors. This is because we have not found variables that are likely to affect the
probability of public sector employment, but not public sector wages, and that could
consequently be used to identify selection models. Further evidence on the potential
importance of such effects, aIld in particular on whether such effects could be more
important in some states than others, is an important topic for future investigation.
A second issue that warrants investigation is the effect of fiscal and labor market
institutions on public sector employment. While fluctuations in the relative wage paid to
public and private sector workers can affect total spending by state and local governments,
changes in employment could have even larger effects. There are many dimensions on
which employment can be affected by fiscal and labor market institutions: dO\VIlsizing
existing departments, increased reliance on volunteers, privatization of government
functions, and elimination of services are all examples of adjustments that could affect the
size of the public sector workforce. Poterba and Rueben (1995) present some preliminary
evidence suggesting that propeny tax limits and labor market institutions can interact in
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Table I: Estimates of State and Local Employee Wage Premia





1979/80 1990/91 i 979/80
Women
1990/91
California 29,760 -.052 .069 .097 .077
(.012) (.013) (.012) (.014)
New York 17,990 -.051 .048 .022 .073
(.012) (.OJ2) (.013) (.013)
Texas 16,987 -.123 -.090 -.024 -.066
(.017) (.019) (.015) (.016)
Florida 12,938 -.041 .046 .060 .095
(.021) (.019) (.018) (.016)
Pennsylvania 11,882 -.127 -.049 .041 .065
(.017) (.020) (.017) (.020)
Illinois 11,431 -.094 -.011 .075 .034
(.018) (.019) (.018) (.018)
Ohio 10,847 -.172 -~063 .008 .077
(.017) (.018) (.017) (.018)
Michigan 9,295 -.112 -.037 .074 .133
(.018) (.018) (.019) (.019)
New Jersey 7,730 -.076 .006 .068 .053
(.019) (.018) (.020) (.017)
North Carolina 6,629 -.045 -.048 .012 .038
(.023) (.018) (.017) (.016)
Georgia 6,478 -.149 -.052 .001 -.054
(.024) (.036) (.022) (.030)
Massachusetts 6,016 -.127 -.044 .045 .007
___________________________________________{~~~~. ~~~~~2 S~~3~) ~~_~~L _
Notes: Results are from regressions run on data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS for full-time
employees. Regressions also controlled for educational attainr .lent, experience, marital status, race, SMSA status
and state of residence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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State Tax & Expenditure -.026
Limits (.022)
Binding State Limi ~ j -.006 -.000 -.020 -.015
(.022) (.020) (.019) (.017)
Recent Local Property Tax -.042 -.036 -.030 -.042 -.037
Limits (.019) (.019) (.019) (.016) (.015)
Average Unemployment Rate, -.014 -.017
1980-89 (.006) (.005)
Collective Bargaining Index .059 .034
(.030) (.030)





State Tax & Expenditure .007
Limits (.018)
Binding State .007 .011 -.007 ...003
(.017) (.016) (.016) (.0]5)
Recent Local Property Tax -.056 -.038 -.051 -.063 -.059
Limits (.016) (.007) (.017) (.013) (.013)
Average Unemployment Rate, -.012 -.015
1980-89 (.006) (.005)
Collective Bargaining Index .049 .027
(.033) (.032)
Right to Work Lay, -.047 -.064
(.019) (.019)
._--------------------------~---------------------------------------------------------
Notes: Results are from regressions run on data from the Outgoing Rotation GIOUpS of the CPS for full-time
workers. Regressions also controlled for educational attainmen~ experience, marital status, race, SMSA status and
state of residence. In addition, these demographic characteristics (excluding state of residence) were allo\ved to
differ in the latter period. A set of state specific indicator variables are also included for state and local
employment. Reported coeffici~ts are for interactions of variables with an indicator variable for employment in
the state and local sector in 1990/91. State tax and expenditure limits were only allowed to affect state workers
and local property tax limits were allowed to affect local workers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
are corrected for within-state correlation. The adjusted R-squared are .400 and .348 for men and women
respectively.
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State Tax & Expenditure .056
l,imits (.023)
Binding State Limits .042 .050 .039 .046
(.026) (.025) (.025) (.024)
Recent Local Property Tax -.017 -.023 -.0]7 -.022 -.018
Limits (.022) (.022) (.022) (.020) (.020)
Average Unemployment REte, -.010 -.010
1980-89 (.005) (.005)
Collective Bargaining Index .G46 .031
(.027) (.025)
Right to Work Law .00 I -.009
I (.019) (.020)




State Tax & Expenditure .056
Limits (.017)
Binding State .056 .054 .~54 .051
(.018) (.019) (.017) (.018)
Recent Local Property Tax -.011 -.015 -.017 -.015 -.016
Limits (.015) (.OIS) (.015) (.014) (.014)
Average Unemployme:- ~ R~':et .003 .004
1980-89 (.003) (.003)
Collective Bargaining Index .025 .031
(.017) (.018)
Right to Work Law -.002 .002
(,014) (.014)
._--------------------------~----------------------------------------------------------
Notes: Results are from regressions run on data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS for full-time
workers. Regressions also controlled for educationa! attainment, experience, marit11 status, race, SMSA status and
state of residence. In addition, these demographic characteristics (excluding state of residence) were allowed to
differ in the latter period. A set of state specific indicator variables are also included for state and local
employment. Reported coefficients are for interactiOilS l)f variables with an indicator variable for employment in
the state and local sector in 1990/91. State tax and expenditure limits were only allowed to affect state workers
and local property tax limits were allowed to affect local workers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
are corrected for within..state correlation. The adjusted R-squared are .400 and .348 for men and "omen
resp£ctiv~ly.
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Table 4: l~iscal& Labor Market Institutions and Relative Changes in Public Sector Wages Instrumenting for




State Tax & Expenditure -.043
Limits (.026)
Binding State Linlits -.038 -.019 -.069 -.048
(.031) (.032) (.032) (.033)
Recent Local Property Tax -.063 -.057 -.043 -.083 -.067
Limits (.021 ) (.021) (.022) (.023) (.023)
Average Unemployment Rate, -.014 -.016
1980-89 (.003) (.005)
Collective Bargaining Index .055 .032
(.016) (.OJ7)






State Tax & Expenditure -.073
Limits (.024)
Binding State -.073 -.061 -.125 -.109
(.029) (.016) (.032) (.032)
Recent Local Property Tax -.142 -.135 -.127 -.174 -.163
Limits (.020) (.020) (.017) (.022) (.023)
Average Unemployment Rate, -.008 -.011
1980-89 (.003) (.003)
Collective Bargaining Index .034 .018
(.014) (.014)
Right to Work Law -.080 -.090
(.01 k) (.012)
._--------------------------~-----_.._---------------------------------------------
Notes: Results are from regressions run on data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS for full-time
work.:rs. Regressions also controlled for educational attainment, experience, marital status, race, SMSJ\ status and
state of residence. In addition, these demographic characteristics (excluding state of residence) were allowed to
differ in the latter period. A set of state specific indicator variables are also included for state and local
employment. Reported coefficients are for interactions of variables \\,ith an indicator variable for employment in
the state and local sector in 1990/91. State tax and expenditure limits were only allowed to affect state workers
and local property tax limits were allowed to affect l\lcal workers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Cbapter3
How Tax Limits Affect Teacher Quality
joint with David Fig/io. University ofOregon
In the last few years there has been a renewed interest on the part of voters for
property tax relief or tax limitation laws in general. The number of tax limitation laws on
the ballot across the country has increased to levels not seen since the Utax revolt" of the late
1970s and early 1980s. In 1996, for instance, there were 9 initiatives on the ballots of 8
states, of which 7 passed.J7 While this new era of tax revolt is occurring it is important to
reflect on what, ifany, effects these new restrictions have on the functioning of state aJld
local government and more specifically on what the effect of these limits might have on
locally provided goods, such as public education.
To date, several recent papers have investigated the effects of these recent limits.
However, the results from these papers have been mixed so far. Dye and McGuire
(forthcoming) find that after the Illinois legislature passed a property revenue cap on
localities in the suburban Chicago area in 1991, the level of growth in property taxes fell
significantly. Ho\\'ever, the)' also find that while overall school district revenues fell, the
cuts in spending occurred in nun-instructional areas, suggesting that the incidence ()f the
37Califomia, Oklahoma and Oregon passed or strengthened existing property tax laws,
with Oklahoma passing a limit on the growth rate of assessnlents and a limit on property tax
rates. Idaho and Nebraska also had property tax limit initiatives on the ballot in 1996, but these
ballot measures were defeated. The remaining three ballot measures ceq" a '-', 2/3 nlajority of
voters to pass new state taxes or fees (Florida), or required a 2/3 majorit~ .~ i '~gislator:) or a
majority of voters to pass new state taxes (Nevada and South Dakota).
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Illinois tax limit has not been borne by instruction.38 In a study on the effect of Oregon's
Measure 5, a property tax rate limitation measure passed in 1990, Figlio (1997a) finds that
the tax cap significantly decreased teacher-student ratios~39 Unlike Dye and McGuire, Figlio
finds that the incidence of Oregon'5 tax limit has been borne more by instruction tllan by
administration. This difference in results across states could reflect differences in the
stringency of the laws, differences in state fiscal and economic environments or perhaps
differences in short run dynamics. Thus it may be more infonnative to evaluate more long
run evidence.
During the late 1970s and early 19805, numerous states around the country imposed
limits on the level or growth rate of local public school revenues or expenditures.
Investigating the long-tenn effects of this Ulocal property tax revolt" should provide insight
into the likely long-run effects of the curren! wave of tax limits. In recent years, several
authors have attempted to gauge whether these policies have affected per pupil spending and
other educational quality measures. VariOllS authors, including Figlio (] 997b), have found
that tax revolt-era limits have led to substantially lower levels of measured school senTices,
such as higher student-teacht:r ratios and lower per pupil spending. Figlio (1997b) and
Downes and Figlio (1997) also document a large and significant link between tax limits and
student test performance.
381n a follow-up study, Downes, Dye and McGuire (1997) find that this "collar county"
tax limit had little effect on student achievement, presenting some short tenn evidence of a lack
of effect in at least one public sector output.
39While not reported in Figlio's paper, Measure 5 has also resulted in reduced per pupil
school expenditures, relative to what would have been expected in the 3bsence of the tax cap.
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Despite this evidence that limits lead io decreased student performance and lower
measured school inputs, the mechanism through which tax limitation rules aJld the resulting
changes in school spending is translated into student outcomes is not well understood.
Hanushek (1996) and Betts (1995) summarize vast literatures which suggest that measured
school inputs have Httle or no relationship to student achievement or subsequent labor
market outcomes. Given these findings, so well-accepted in the economics literature that
they ha,'e virtually become "stylized facts:) it may be surprising that the presence of tax
limits could actually substantially affect student achievement.
We suggest that tax limits could affect student achievemen~ not directly through
ieduced spending, but rather indirectly through the quality of teachers in affected schools.
Unlike the lack of a relationship bet\Veen spending (or class sizes) and student outcomes,
there is considerable evidence that specific teacher attributes, such as the selectivity of the
teacher's undergraduate institution (used to proxy for underlying teacher academic ability)
and the teacher's choice of major, strongly affect student achievement (see, e.g., Ehrenberg
and Brewer, 1994). If tax limits systematically affect teacher quality attributes, this would
be a much more compelling explanation for why tax limits appear to reduce student
achievement.
We are interested in gauging whether tax limits have deterred higher-quality
potential teachers from entering the teaching force in the states that have passed local limits.
We compare teacher attributes in different states over time before and after these
limitations were passed. Tax limits could deter college students from becoming education
majors if they view a tax limit as a threat to finding a job, future pay increases or working
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conditions. College students may therefore choose a different, non-teaching career route
than they would have ordinarily chosen in the absence of the tax limit. If individuals with
stronger abilities are deterred at a higher rate than those with lower ability, then the long run
effect of passing a tax limit law would be a decrease in the qualit)T of the teaching force
within a state.40
Studying the effect of tax limits on the qualit)' of teachers is made more complicated
by the fact that these limits exert a direct constraint on the demand for teachers by school
districts and an indirect effect on the supply of individuals who choose to become teachers.
It may be the case that the qualifications of hired teachers increases due to the lessened
demand for incoming teachers as long as school districts can measure applicant ability and
there is no change in applicant pool after the passage of a tax limit. While we are interested
in the quality of teaching overall within school districts we would also like to disentungle the
effect on the demand for teachers from possible supply effects of becoming a teacher. We
do this by focussing on the decision of new entrants into the labor market at two points in
the decision process. We examine the ability level of people who major in education and
then examine the qualifications of new teachers.
This paper is divided into fOUf sections. In section one we describe more formally
the decision process behind becoming an education major and the relationship between the
passage of tax limitation laws and ability level. Section two presents empirical evidence on
4°Similarly, if tax limits lead to a decrease in the relative wage of public school teachers
as compared to teacher wages in other states this quality drain could be accelerated. While we do
not investigate the migration patterns of existing teachers in this version, \ve hope to do so in
subsequent versions of this paper.
92
the change in average ability level of education majors and non-majors before and after the
tax revolt occurred in states that did and did not pass limits. Section three then examines
how the attributes of new teachers has changed after the tax revolt, fL'cussing on the
probability of new teachers to be education majors and on the :;electivity of the colleges
attended by these new teachers. Section four concludes and describes further directions for
this research.
1. Conceptual Framework
We assume that there is a direct demand effect of tax limits on the budget of school
districts. If the price for teachers is set by contract, tJlat is Wnew = Wcontract , then a binding tax
limitation law leads to a decrease in the number of available positions. If there is no change
in who decides to qualify to become a teacher and school districts can ascertain ability, then
this would lead to an increase in the average ability of teachers in tax limit states.41
However, there is no reason to believe that individuals will not react to the
infonnation about working conditions which the passage of a tax limit gives them about both
the probability of finding a teaching job and the attractiveness of teaching jobs. Indeed,
individuals could even possib1y overreact ancl1Jetieve tllat-tlle l'Jassage of a taX iimirllas a
greater effect on job openings and wages than it actually does. Evidence has borne out that
tax limitation laws have had a negative effect on both the relative wages of teachers in tax
41If school districts can adjust wages and can measure ability, then a budget cut caused by
a tax limit can directly decrease ability if school districts respond to budget cuts by decreasing
wages and looking for a lower qualified workforce.
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limit statps (poterha--aP.d-Rueben, 1997; Figliwnoof-6f-teaeking positiun~s----
available (Figlio, 1997b). We wish to more fully examine this supply effect.
Fonnally, we are interested in the effects of tax limits on the average ability of
potential new teachers. We will abstract from the decision to become a teacher and assume
that an individual must be an education major within a given state in order to qualify to
become a teacher42• We model the decision of individual j to become an education major as
follows. Individuals have ability a which ranges from il to ~, with a ~ 3 j ~~, and have taste
for becoming a teacher b which ranges from 11 to~, with 12 ~bj s:.,Q. Individual j becomes an
education major if
Q=£I V(ed-major) I - £1 V(non-ed major)1>0
the expected utility from becoming an education major is greater than the expected utility of
majoring in some other field. We will also assume that EI V(ed-major) r = U(being a
teacher) *Pk(teacher) , where U(.) represents the expected utility of becoming a teacher and
Ptc(teacher) is the (individual-specific, even though subscripts are dropped) probability of
teaching jobs being available in state k and that V(.) is increasing in U a.tld P.
We also define U(being a teacher) = f(sk(tJ,ek(tk),bj ) , where tk is an indicator for
whether state k adopts a local tax limitation law, Sk reflects the saiary of being a teacher in
42This assumes potential teachers cannot attend college out of state. To gauge how
restrictive this assumption is we measured migration patterns for new coll~ge graduates (those
under 30) in the 1980 five percent sample of the U.S. Census. We find 74 percent of college
graduates under the age of 30 are in the same state in 1980 as they \vere in 1975. This
percentage is even greater for teachers under the age of 30, who were in the same state in both
years 82 percent of the time.
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state k and is a function of tk and the state economy, ek reflects the teaching environment in
state k which is also a function of tic' and includes factors like class size and teaching
responsibilities, and again bj is the taste for teaching of individual j. We assume that f(.) IS
increasing in salary, teaching environment) and th~ individual's taste for teaching, but that
both salary and teaching environment decrease when a tax limit is imposed.43
Finally, we asswne that the probability of a job being available is a function of
individual ability (~) and qk , the n~lber of open teaching positions in state k, which is itself
a function of t;.: and state demographics, like nwnber of school age children and that this
probability is increasing in teacher ability but decreasing in tk~ Finally, we take a simplified
approach to representing the returns to becoming a non-education nlajor. The expected
utility of majoring in some other subject in college is given as EIV(non-major)1 = Z(~,bj) -
c(~) , where Z is the return to being a non-education major and c is the cost of being a noo-
education major. We assume that Z is an increasing function of ability, but is not affected
by the imposition of a tax limit in the state and that the cost of being a non-education major
is decreasing in ability.
V/e would like to calculate what the effect of a change in tax limit status will have on
the average ability of education majors in state k. Reiterating our expression from above,
4JFigiio (1997b) arid Poterba and Rueben (i995) find that relative teacher salaries
decrease when states impose tax limits. Figlio's (1997b) findings of increased student-teacher
ratios also provide suggestive evidence that teachirlg environment decreased witll tax limits as
well.
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we suggest that an individual j in state k selects into education if:
n=EI V(ed-major) I - Ef V(non-edmajor) I >0
== U(s(t),e(t),b)p(a,q(t») - [z(a,b) - c(a)] >0
where the person who is just indifferent between becoming an education major or a non-
education major has Q(a)=-=O. Applying the implicit fimction theorem, it Call be shown that
da/dt<O if
u· P I(a) < (Z1(a) - c I(a)) .
While we would expect this to be the case, especially given that Ballou (1996) provides
evidence suggesting that p'ea) may even be zero (or negative!) in public schools, the fact
that we can not sign this effect witll certainty makes this an empirical question. In the next
section we will estimate the empirical magnitude of this effect.
2. Tax Limits and tbe Ability Levels of Education Majors
We are interested in gauging whether the passage of tax and expenditure limits has
systematically affected the quality of individuals enterillg the teaching force. To do so, we
must gather data on the relative quality of new teachers across states, before and after the
passage of tax and expenditure limits. The approach we take is as follows: we use two
nationally representative longitudinal data sets, the National Longitudinal Stlrvey of the
High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) and the High School and Beyond (HSB) survey
(sophomore cotlort) to get, in essence, two cohorts of potential teachers, one that graduated
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from high school and selected college majors well before the tax re"/olt of the late 1970s, and
the other that graduated high school after the tax revolt had passed. In each of these data
sets, all high school seniors took a series of academic examinations in mathematics and
verbal ability. Since we know the discipline into which each college-attending sample
member selected, we can determine whethrr there are systematic differences in academic
ability between those who select into education and those who do not in each cohort. We
can then investigate whether the passage of tax limits has systematically affected this
difference, and in which direction.
To address this question, we raust have a measure of academic ability that can be
compared across time. Fortunately, both NLS-72 and HSB tested every student in each
respective cohort in mathematics and verbal ability. The two rounds of tests are measured in
different units, but can be adjusted so that they are directly comparable. We perfolm this
adjustment as follows: We assume that any given score on the ACT test is time-invariant
(that is, a "23" on the ACT in 1972 means the same thing as a "23" on the Ac·r in 1982).
Since a sizeable subset of each cohort took the ACT exam, we can use the ACT as a
benchmark to detennine a score matching between the NLS-72 and HSB. For the students
in each cohort who took the ACT, we regress the student's A~,-T score on the relevant test's
composite (verbal plus math) ability score.44 We use these regression results to construct an
"ACT-equivalent" score for every student in both cohorts. Using this algorithm, we convert
each NLS-72 student's ability test score into HSB units.
44Details on these regressions are available upon request.
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Almost without exceptioJl, leachers in the United States have at least a bachelor's
degree. When we compare ability levels of people selecting into education to others, we
must choose a comparison group with a comparable level of education. Therefore, we linlit
our sample to individuals who have graduated frorn college by the last round of each sample
(1986 for the NLS-72 cohort; 1992 for the HSB cohort). We ha".:e also experimented with
restricting this "completion by" date for the NLS-72 cohort to 1978, for fear that we might
have a few individuals in the NLS-72 cohort who attended college and chose their m_ajors
after the tax revolt had begun. It turns out that this sampling modification does not change
our estimated parameters of int_1. ~st in any substantive way. In all, we have 1,450
observations with complete dab in the NLS-72 cohort and 2,933 observations with complete
data in the HSB cohort, for a total of 4,383 observations. Of these, 477 individuals, or
eleven percent, selected into an education major45 •
Since we are interested in estimating the effect of the passage of tax and expenditure
limits on a college student's decision of whether to major in education, we must first address
the question: whose tax limit is relevant? Does the student respond to a tax limit in his or
her home state, for instance, or a tax limit in the state ill which he or she is attending
college? Evidence from the NLS-72 suggests that the second OptiOll is probably more likely:
in the cases in which a student attends a college out of state, college stlldents are Inore likely
45In most specifications we also control for individual characteristics like gender and race,
and our NLS-72 sample is decreased by 25 observations when these controls are added. The
omission of these observations from our raw sample does not affect our results or the proportion
of education majors in our sample.
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to remain in the state where they attended college than return to the state in which they
graduated from high SCllOOI. Therefore, the results that we report in tllis paper count as the
relevant tax limit any policy changes that take place in the state where the individual attends
co/lege. As a sensitivity test, we have also estimated our models in which tht: relevant .
policy changes are those that take place in the state where the student attended high school;46
it turns out that this modification barely changes the parameter estimates of interest.
We initially present some basic descriptive analysis. Table 1 compares colJege
graduates with education majors to college graduates majoring in other fields in both cohorts
of students. The first row of the table reports mean HSB-equivalent ability test scores, by
cohort and major. Each cell also presents the standard deviation and the nUlnber of
observations within that category for illustrative purposes. We observe that in both cohorts,
education majors average considerably lower ability test scores than do non-education
majors. In the NLS-72 (students who graduated from high school in 1972), education
majors averaged 12.4 percent lower ability test scores than did non-education-major college
graduates. This gap had shrunk to a still sizeable and statistically significant 9.7 percent by
the HSB cohort (students who graduated from high school in 1982).
We tllell COulpare education majors to non-education majors in states that passed tax
limits. The results of these comparisons are reported in the next two rows of Table 1. In the
46-While the NLS-72 identifies the school district attended by students, the restricted-
access version of the HSB does not even identify the state \vhere the student went to high school.
However, the identities of colleges attended are reported in HSB. Therefore, we say that tile high
school's state (in the HSB cohort) is the state where the largest number of students from that
school eventually attended college.
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NLS-72, our pre-tax revolt cohort, we find that educatior. majors in states that would
eventually pass tax limits averaged 10.9 percent lower ability lc'vels than did non-education
majors, while education majors in states that l1ever passed tax limits averaged 13.4 percent
lower ability levels than did non-education majors.47 By the HSB, after tax. revolt-era limits
were passed, these relative levels had been rever5ed. Education majors in tax limit states
avelaged 13.2 percent lower achievement levels than did non-education Inajors (that is, the
gap widened even as nortlTIajor achievement fell slightly in limit states), while the gap
between education majors and non-education majors in no-limit st.1tes fell to 7.5 percent.
Therefore, the qualitative evidence suggests that while states that never passed tax limits saw
a 46 percent decrease in the gap between education majors and non-education majors over
the decade encompassing the tax reVOlt, this gap in tax limit states actually increased by 17
percent. Moreover, the average absolute ability level of education majors fell over this
decade as compared to a modest increase in absolute ability level of education majors in non
tax revolt states.
The above comparisons do not control for any changes in the individual attributes of
individuals across the two samples. Surely there are other variables, suell as gender alld
race, that affect a potential teacher's decision to enter the education profession and our
47We categorize states as tax lim.it states only if they in1posed a tax limit on school
districts tlIat either explicitly limited revenues or expenditures, or limited both th.e tax rate and
assessment growth. We further restrict our sample of tax limit states to those v/hich imposed a
limit during the 1976-1983 time period. The states that passed these "potentially binding" types
of tax limits on school districts during the tax revolt are Arkansas, California, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, ~Jew f\.1exico, Ohio,
Texas and Washington. In table 2 we examine how changes to this categorization effect our
results. Infonnation on tax limitation laws is primarily from Mullins aT.ld Cox( 1994).
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quality measure, standardized test scores. If for SOlne reason our sample systematically and
disproportionately consisted of particular groups of individuals ill certain states, it is possible
that we may be attributing to changes in public policy differences in average ability
stemming from variations in demographic characteristics. OUf concern in misattributing
causation to the passage of tax limits to an artifact of our data is increased due to the limited
number of education majors we have for certain states.
Therefore, in the bottom panel of Table 1 we repeat the above analysis, but this tinle
control for differences in individual race and gender.48 Here, we report the mean residllals
of regressions of teacher ability on race and gender, across major and cohort. We find that
the results are qualitatively similar to those reported above. Again we find opposite effects
in tax-limit and no limit states. While the gap in ability decreased by half in states that did
not pass a tax and expenditure limit over this time period, the gap increased by 18 percent in
the states that passed tax limits during the relevant period. Therefore, after controlling for
individual attributes we still fmd that tax litnits are associated with decreases in teacher
ability, relative to the changes in teacher ability that occurred in no-limit states.
These results suggest that the differences between tax limit states and those without
limits may be systematically different before and after tile tax revolt. At the bottom of Table
1 'Ne present some preliminary evidence to this effect. While the pre-limit difference in
education major/non-education major difference in tax limit and non-tax limit states (i.e. the
difference in difference) is small and positive (although not statistically sigllificant), after the
48 We also examined including a measure of socio-econonlic status, which increased the
effect on education major quality of the imposition of tax limit laws.
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tax revolt the ability gap between education majors and non-majors 'Nas significantly larger
in tax limit states than in no-limit states. While the abiJ.ity gap between. education majors
and non-education majors shrunk over the sample period in no-linlit states, it increased in
tax limit states.
Why might the gap in average ability between education majors and non-education
majors have shrunk in no-limit states dluing the 1970s and early 1980s? One possible
reason is that teacher salaries, relative to those of other college-educated adults, may have
risen during this period in no-limit states. The decrease in the ability gap becomes even
larger when one controls for gender. This is expected, because in tIle early 1970s a larger
fraction of high-ability women entered the teaching profession than did in the early 1980s.
Failure to take into account this "natural" change in the demographic structure of who selects
into teachillg would lead to an understatement of the degree to which the gap in ability has
decreased over time.
Differences-in-differences-in-difJerences results
We are now ready to more fOrrlally discuss the apparent effects of tax limits on the
gap in average ability between education m.ajors and non-education majors. To do so, we
adopt a differences-in-differences-in-differences estimation strategy, similar to that used by
Gruber and Madrian (1994). Essentially, we 'Nish to detennine whether the change over
time in the ability gap between education majors and non-education majors differs
systematically depending on whether the student's state passed a tax limit during the
intennediate period.
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Tile first cell in Table 2 presents the estimated parameter 0 in the equation
test score = eX + ct year (Y) + Plimit (L) + y edmajor (E)
+ <Y*L .+ " Y*E + AE*L + 0 E*L·Y + E ,
where individual and ltime subscripts are assumed but omitted and Y={O ifNLS-72 (pre tax
revolt) and 1 if HSB (}~ost revolt)} and X is a vector of individual specific characteristics
(race, ethnicity, gender and family socio-economic status). We can interpret 0 as the
difference between tax limit states and no-limit states in the change from the NLS-72 cohort
to t.he HSB cohort in the abilit)f gap between education majors and non-education majors,
holding constant observable characteristics. A negative value of 0 would indicate that, all
else equal, the ability ga.p between education majors and non-education majors has widened
since the tax revolt in tIDr limit states, relative to no-limit states.49 We correct all standard
errors for within-state error correlation and heteroskedasticity.
We observe a negative and statistically significant relationship between tax limits
aJld the relative ability leveJ of education majors relative to non-education majors. This
eigllt point change in the relative ability level ofeducation majors translates into a 10
pt.~rce!1t decrease in ability lev'el, when evaluating ability at the mean value.
In addition to repeating the analysis from Table 1, in Table 2 we present results
incluliinl~ state fixed effects and allowing changing economic aIId demographic factors
within a state to have an effect on average student ability. If there is some systematic
difference in the relative test scores of education and non-education majors within a state,
49Later in the paper we explicitly control for time-invariant and time-varying state-
specific effects.
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we do not want to attribute any of its effect to the introduction of tax limits. Similarly,
variables that might vary across time and across states that might change the demand for
teachers or the attractiveness of other job opportunities should also be controlled for.
We therefore include state per-capita income and percent of state population that is
between five and seventeen for each state and year in the regressions. 50 Including these
covariates slightly increases the size of the difference in test scores of education and noo-
education majors between tax limit and no tax limit states and also increases the precision of
our estimate. Controlling for state covariates, the over time change in average ability in
education and non-education majors is again negative and significant at the five percent
level. We then examine how sensitive our results are to how we categorized the different
states. The third through fifth panels of Table 2 report the differential in quality results by
type of limit and by passage date of limit. During the tax-revolt period 14 states passed
limits, and of these, five limits required states tc rollback property tax rates if revenues rose
by more than a certain amount after reassessments. These limits were passed to curtail the
growth in revenues caused solely by large increases in property values, but did not limit
revenue growth in non-assessment years. 51 Including a separate variable for these states
SOWe also tested our specification by including a number of other state specific variables
including population, total state income, percent of the population over 65 and under 5 and a
measure of the state's liberailless based on the state's U.S. Senators' scores on selected votes as
determined by Americans for Democratic Action. The results did not change significantly \vhen
these variables were included and they had no predictive power once state fixed effects were
added. If state fixed effects are excluded and these other covariates are included, again the
results do not change significantly.
51The states with only revenue limits in new assessment years are Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Missouri and Texas.
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increases the magnitude of the effect of tax limits on relative ed-major quality slightly to 10
points. As predicted, the estimated relative decline in education major quality in assessment
rollback states is lower than in tax limit states-an estimated reduction of six points. While
this forty percent decline in effect seems economically large, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the two types (\f laws had the same effect on education major qualil'J.
Panels 4 and 5 of Table 2 expand the number of states considered tax limit states by
including an additional seven states which passed potentially binding limits in the 1969-
1974 period. Unlike the limits passed in the late 70's, most of these earlier limits (5) were
expenditure limits which typically gave the state more control over the growth rate in per
pupil spending in the school district.52 Comparing 1J.'1is larger group of states does not
(quantitatively or statistically) significantly change our earlier findings. We also cannot
reject the hypothesis that expenditure and revenue limits have the same effect on relative
school quality.
Our results may also be confounded by the fact that many states enacted school
finance refonns over the same period. As a first pass, assume that all school finance refonns
are created equaL Now we again estimate the effects ofta'X limits on teacher ability, but this
time we control for the implementation of an)' type of school finance refonn identified by
52 Th.e states which passed limits in this earlier period were Arizona, Colorado, Indiana,
Iow~ Kansas, Minnesota, and Utah. States with only expenditure limits are Arizona, Colorado,
Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey and Jowa. California and Massachusetts have both an
expenditure limit and a revenue limit.
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Downes and Shah (1995).53 Therefore, the second column of Table 2 presents the estimated
parameter 0 in the equation
test score = eX + a Y + PL + YE + , Y*L + Tl Y*E + AE*L + 0 E*L·Y
+ Jl refonn state (R) + v Y*R + ~ E*R + 1t E*R*y + E ,
where all notation is as before, except that now we include a separate set of school finance
refonn variables in the model. (Where appropriate, state-specific effects and covariates are
part of X) We find qualitatively similar though slightly larger results.
Next, we take to heart "Hoxby's (1996) concern that not all school finance refonns are
created equa1. Here, we replace the school finance refonn vari~blesdescribed above with
two sets ofrefonn variables and the resultant parameters {J!, v, ~, 1t}, one set each for the
states that implemented pro-spending and anti-spending school finance refonns, as defined
by Hoxby (1996).54 We report our estimate of 0 in this specification in the third column of
Table 2.
We observe that when we differentiate between pro-spending and anti-spending
5300 thjs basis, states that passed school finance reforms during the relevant time period
were Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, Wyoming and Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia atid Wisconsin The first set
of states passed court mandated refonns while the second set of states passed state legislated
school finance refonns.
S4Hoxby (1996) identifies as "pro-spending" the school finance refonns in Connecticut,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Vermont could also be considered
"pro-spending," as it repealed an "anti-spending" refonn dwing this period (it turns out not to
m&tter in this analysis how Vennont is categorized). States identified as having "anti-spending"
refonns are California, Delaware, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Utah, Virginia and
Wyoming.
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school finance refonns, the estimated effect of tax limits is stIli larger and more statistically
significant than was reported in the second column of the table. This result suggests that,
holding constant whetller a state also implemented a pro-spending or anti-spending school
finance reform, the difference between limit and no-limit states in the education major-
nonmajor ability gap increased after passage of the tax limits. As before, this result holds
for all of our categorizations of tax limit states.
This portion of our analysis, therefore, leads to several distinct conclusions. First,
we present significant evidence that tax revolt-era tax and expenditure limits have led to an
increase in the ability gap between education majors and non-education majors in the
affected states. This effect is not onl}'- statistically significant, but is substantial in magnitude
as well. 1n addition, we find tins result is invariant to increasirlg the tax-revolt period to
include expenditure limits passed in the early 19705. Finally, we find that controlling for
whether the state also passed school finance refonns is important in gauging the degree to
v;hich the tax limits affected teacher quality. It is interesting to note that the difference-in-
difference-in-difference coefficients on the school fmance refonn variables are generally not
statistically significant, nor are they typically sizeable in magnitude. Therefore, while we
find substantial evidence that tax limits led to diminished teacher quality, we generally
cannot differentiate from zero the parallel effect of school finance refonns.
3. Changes in attributes of new teachers
The results presented in tile preceding discussion suggest that tax limits have had
substantial negative effects on the average relative ability level of education majors. But this
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is only an imperfect approximation of the effects of tax limits on teacher qualitya \Vhile th,e
vast majority of them do, not all education majors eventually become teachers. In addition,
not all public school teachers were education majors in college. Therefore, it is always
possible that the decrease in the overall ability level of education majors as an apparent
conseq\lenCe of tax limits is not an accurate representation of what actually tlappened to the
average ability level of teachers in general.
Ideally, we would be able to repeat the analyses presented in Tables 1 and 2 using
employment as a pIJblic school teacher, rather than college education major, to split the
sample. Then \ve could directly test the hypothesis that tax limits not only affected average
education major abilit)i, but also affected average public school teacher ability.
Unfortunately, we do not have the data to conduct such a test. While the NLS-72 and HSB
each identify an individual's occupation, so it is possible to tell whether the individual is (or
was) a school teacher, it is impossible in either survey to identify the sector of the teacher's
employment. If the average ability level of private school teachers, and if the proportion of
new teachers entering the public and private sectors, are time-invariant in a state, this would
not necessarily be a problem. But there is little reason to believe that this would be the case.
Instead, if tax limits are associated, as the evidence suggests, with fewer public school
teachers per student or increased private school enrollments, one would suspect that the
proportion of new teachers entering the private sector should have systematically increased
in tax limit states. So even if the average ability level of private school teachers in a state is
time-invariant, we cannot use the available data to directly estimate the effect of tax limits
on public school teacher ability levels.
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We can, however, use a different data set to indirectly measure the relationship
between tax limits and teacher qualifications. Specifically, we use the 1987-88 round of the
Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), conducted by the u.s. Department of Education, to
make inferences about the changes in teacher attributes over time. While we do not have
ability test measures for teachers in the SASS, we do have infonnation of specific teacher
credentials, such as the college major and the identity of the college attended. Since
nlunerous college guidebooks categorize colleges in tenns of their selectivity, we are
consequently able to identify the rough relative selectivity of the colleges that the teachers
attended. College selecti""ity has been shown (e.g., by Loury and Garman, 1996) to be
strongly related to ability test scores, and has also been shown (e.g., by Ehrenberg and
Brewer, 1994) to be strongly independently correlated with student academic achievement.
Using the SASS, we compare the attributes of public school teachers who entered the
teaching force in 1984 through 1987 (the four most recent years in the sample, and all
following the tax revolt) to those who entered the teaching force from 1974 through 1977
(preceding the tax reVOlt, and around the same age group as the NLS-72 sample). A
drawback of using the SASS is that we rely on observations of people who remained in
teaching through the tax revolt to make inferences about who selected into teaching prior to
the tax revolt. While higher ability teachers tend to have shorter spells of teaching and
higher levels of mobility (Eberts and Stone, 1984; Murnane and Olsen, 1989; and Rickman
and Parker, 1990), this identification strategy is still acceptable as long as the relationship
between teacher ability and mobility, say ~ is not systematically related to the passage of tax
limits, as any differences \\111 be absorbed into a cohort-specific fixed effect. We have no
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way of telling for certain whether such a relationship exists. If, however, tax limits
disproportionately induce high-ability teachers to· leave teaching, the remaining teachers
from this pre-revolt cohort will on average be weaker than they would have been in tIle
absence of a tax limit. If this is the case, we understate (in magnitude) the estimated effect
of tax limits on teacher ability using data from after the tax revolt.
The first row of rfable 3 presents the estimated effect of tax limit imposition on the
probability that a teacher graduated from a selective college. We define a selective college
as one that Lovejoy's guide to colleges identifies as "competitive," Uhighly competitive," or
Umost competitive. 1J Specifically, we present the e~timated change in probability of having
the given credential giVe!l a change in tax-limit statusL We estimate a maximum likelihood
probit model in which the dependent variable is the probability of graduating from a
selective college, and we control for cohort effects ill tax limit and no limit states, the
percentage of the state population that is school-aged during the appropriate cohort, and state
per-capita income during the relevant period.
"We estimate that tax limits 3I'e associated with about five percentage points' lower
probability that a newly-hired teacher will have graduated from a selective institution, all
else equal. Given that the pre-revolt probability of graduation from a selective institution
(measured from the cohort who began teaching from 1974 to 1977) Vlas 67 percent, this
implies that tax limits are associated with new teachers who are about 7.5 percent less likely
to have graduated from selective institutions than would have occurred in the absence of the
tax limit. The results are roughly the same magnitude whether or not we control for the
existence of school finance reforms, either generically or using Hoxby's (1996) pro-
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spending or anti-spending characterizations. Therefore, these resuits are consistent with
those pr~sented in Table 2. These results provide suggestive evidence that tax limits are
associated with lower levels of tee:.· '". ability, all else equal.
Since two-thirds of teachers in Ott( sample gradua!ed from selective institutions, we
also experimented with other thresholds of college selectivity. Therefore, in the second row
of Tabie 3 we present the results of differences-in-differences regressions in which we
estimate the effects of tax limits on the probability that the teacher will have graduated from
an elite college, one ranked "highly competitive ti or better by Lovejoy's guide. We find that
in the specification excluding school finance refonns, tax limits are associated with 2.5
percentage points' lower probability that a new teacher will have graduated from a highly
selective college. Since ten percent of our pre-tax revolt cohort graduated from a highly
selective institution, this implies that tax limits have been associated with a 25 percent lower
probability that a new teacher attended an elite undergraduate institution. Therefore, while
tax limits apparently reduce the probability that public schools within tax limit states \"ill
hire teachers from any selective institution, public schools are especially less likely to hire
teachers from higWy selective colleges on a proportionate basis.
Might tax limits also affect the distribution of education mCijors versus non-education
majors amongst newly-hired teachers? To address this question, we estimate the probability
that a teacher will have an education major, using the same methods as before. We find, as
is sho'Wll in the third row of Table 3, no evidence that tax limits are related to the probability
ofhirillg an education major. However, conditioning on hiring an education maj"or, tax
limits are significantly associated with lower ability levels amongst the teachers that public
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schools hire. Specifically, araong education majors, tax limits are associated Witll 4.8
percentage points (7.4 percent) lower probability of hiring educa!ioll nlajors WllO graduated
from selective institutions in general, and 2.4 percentage points (30 percent) lower
probability of hiring education majors \vho graduated frOITl hig~dy selective colleges.
Therefore, while public schools subject to tax limits are no nlGre or less likely to hire
education majors as a result of the tax limitation policy, they are more likely to hire
education majors who graduated fronJ less selective institutions.
4. Conclusions
Prior authors who have investigated the effects of fiscal constraints on school
services have found that tax limits are associated with higher student-teacher ratios and
lower teacher salaries. But the education literature strongly suggests that there is little
relationship between these measured school inputs and student achievement. Therefore, it is
difficult to conceive of how the relationships between tax limits and student achievement
found by Figlio (1997b) and Do\vnes and Figiio (1997) are due to changes in Ineasured
school inputs such as the student-teacher ratio.
We find that tax limits apparently systelnatically deter higll-ability individuals from
entering public school teaching in affected states. Tax limits are associated with
significantly lower average education major ability levels (relative to nonmajor college
graduates), and are also apparently associated with lower ability levels of public school
teachers as well. Since specific teacher attributes such as teacher ability and college
selectivity apparently have large effects on student perfonnance, we argue that the link
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between tax limits and student achievement comes through diminished teacher quality .
Our results have strong policy implications. Teachers clearly respond to fiscal
constraints, either directly (as tax limits may be bad advertising for jobs at public schools) or
indirectly (as tax limits lead to fewer, lower-paying teaching jobs). Since teacher quality
seems to matter in determining student perfonnance but class sizes, for instance, do not, it
seems that schools faced with increased fiscal constraints may wish to attempt to maintain
teacher compensation at the expense of class size. However, such (h" approach may not be a
silver bullet. If teachers--particularly high-ability ones---respond more to environmental
factors such as class size than to financial factors such as salary, then a policy of maintaining
teacher compensation while substantially increasing class size might exacerbate the
situation. This trade-off becomes even more problematic if it is difficltlt for school districts
to measure ajoh applicant's ability level.
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1J5
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Composite (Verbal+Math) Test Scores in NLS-72 and
HSB for Education Majors and NOll-Majors
NLS-72 HS&B
Sample Ed major Noted Difference Ed major Not ed Difference
malQ[ (std error:) !lliUill (std error)
Reported Composite Test Scores:
Full sample 76.32 87.17 -10.85 76.05 84.26 -8.21
[21.84] [21.55] (1.47) [20.01] [21.24] (1.51 )
266 1184 211 2722
Tax limit on 77.43 86.92 -9.49 73.44 84.61 -11.]7
schools [20.66] [21.75] (2.34) [21.68] [20.92] (2.39)
104 453 83 1013
No tax limit on 75.61 87.32 -11.71 77.74 84.05 -6.31
schools [22.60] [21.44] ( 1.88) [18.74] [21.43] (1.95)
162 731 128 1709
Residuals After Partialing Out Gender and Race:
Tax limit on -6.84 1.75 -8.58 -9.26 1.16 -10.42
schools [19.57] [20.40] (2.22) [21.60] [20.15] (2.31 )
102 445 83 1013
No tax limit on -9.94 1.87 -11.81 -5.62 0.31 -5.94
schools [21.78] [20.22] (1.80) [17.83] [20.62] (1.87)
159 719 128 1709
Differences in 3.23 -4.48
EdlNon-Ed Test- (2.87) (2.98)
Scores By Tax
Limit Status
Difference in difference in difference -7.71
(4.00)
Notes: Test scores are expressed in High School and Beyond equivalent test scores. The
.fi-rsffow·ofeacnUceIlj:iiesenlsm-ffte-·me·aii-value. -·Standard-deviations are presented in the
second row of each cell in brackets. The number of observations is given in the third row of
each cell. The differences listed are the difference in means for education majors and non-
education majors, with standard errors listed below.
116
